Stigmatized Beliefs: Conspiracy Theories, Anticipated Negative Evaluation of the Self, and Fear of Social Exclusion

Lantian, Anthony; Michelet, Dominique; Nurra, Cécile; Klein, Olivier; Berjot, Sophie; Pantazi, Myrto

doi:10.31234/osf.io/bgzt4

Cited by 16 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…But, since most research has focused on the causes rather than the consequences of conspiracy theorizing, much more work is needed. For example, there is surprisingly little research into how people who espouse conspiracy theories are viewed, and whilst some research has revealed that people fear social exclusion from expressing conspiracy beliefs (Lantian, Muller, Nurra, Klein, Berjot & Pantazi, ), one study suggests that labelling statements as “conspiracy theories” may not lower their perceived credibility (Wood, ). Future research could examine the social consequences that face people who adopt conspiracy theories.…”

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Douglas

Uscinski

Sutton

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

959

907

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Scholarly efforts to understand conspiracy theories have grown significantly in recent years, and there is now a broad and interdisciplinary literature. In reviewing this body of work, we ask three specific questions. First, what factors are associated with conspiracy beliefs? Our review of the literature shows that conspiracy beliefs result from a range of psychological, political, and social factors. Next, how are conspiracy theories communicated? Here, we explain how conspiracy theories are shared among individuals and spread through traditional and social media platforms. Next, what are the societal risks and rewards associated with conspiracy theories? By focusing on politics and science, we argue that conspiracy theories do more harm than good. We conclude by suggesting several promising avenues for future research.

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Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Douglas

Uscinski

Sutton

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

959

907

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As for the pejorative connotation of the label in its everyday use, it has been shown that one labels as "conspiracy theories" ideas with which one strongly disagrees (Wood & Douglas, 2013). Even though the label itself does not seem to affect the credibility attributed to a piece of information (Wood, 2015), CTs are typically stigmatized beliefs (Lantian et al, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Usually defined as explanations of events based on the concealed role of an evil group (e.g., Keeley, 1999), CTs have also become a prominent topic of research in social psychology, as well as in social sciences in general (for reviews, see Douglas et al, 2019;van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). However, while social psychology research has investigated the antecedents and consequences of endorsing both specific and generic conspiracist beliefs, it has scarcely examined how the label "conspiracy theory" itself is perceived (see however Lantian et al, 2018;Wood, 2015;Wood & Douglas, 2013). Similarly, the rejection of the label "conspiracy theory" by advocates of beliefs labeled as such has been the focus of little interest (Franks, Bangerter, Bauer, Hall, & Noort, 2017;Harambam & Aupers, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A "Conspiracy Theory" Conspiracy? A Mixed Methods Investigation of Laypeople's Rejection (and Acceptance) of a Controversial Label

Nera¹,

Leveaux²,

Klein³

2020

Preprint

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The label "conspiracy theory", while part of everyday media discourse, is considered by many as problematic. In this research, we postulate the existence of diverging social representations associated with this label and that their relative endorsement is a function of preexisting beliefs. To evaluate this possibility, we examine how generic conspiracist beliefs are associated with two forms of rejection of the label: 1) belief in a meta-conspiracy theory, that is, the belief that the label "conspiracy theory" was purposely created by the elites in order to discredit dissent, and 2) a particularist view of conspiracy theories, that is, the idea that "conspiracy theories" are too diverse to draw any generic conclusions regarding their (ir)rationality and that the label is therefore inadequate. Across two studies (Ns = 1297), using Principal Components (Study 1) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Study 2), we found that generic conspiracist beliefs and belief in meta-conspiracy theory were tightly related. Moreover, in Study 2, generic conspiracist beliefs were substantially associated with the endorsement of a particularist view of conspiracy theories. Using lexicometric analyses of open-ended questions about the origin and the perceived validity of the label, we identified four main criticisms addressed to the label: historical (real conspiracies happen), conceptual (the label has no clear definition), normative (the label has a negative connotation) and political (the label is weaponized by powerholders). By contrast, acceptance of the label was justified by arguments referring to common psychological mechanisms, as well as similar narrative and argumentative structures. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. [Manuscript accepted for publication at the International Review of Social Psychology]

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“…CTs are widely derogated (e.g., Uscinski and Parent, 2014 ; Klein et al, 2015 ; Lantian et al, 2018 ). Evidence for the idea that CTs are derogated can also be found in the fact that people who endorse them disagree with the use of the expression “conspiracy theories” (Harambam and Aupers, 2016 ; Franks et al, 2017 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…CTs are, by definition, controversial. Even though they are not per se qualified as false—there have been, indeed, conspiracies in history—they are more often than not considered as intrinsically flawed explanations, regardless of their hypothetical veracity (Keeley, 1999 ) and studies have shown that people who endorse them are perceived rather negatively (Klein et al, 2015 ; Lantian et al, 2018 ). Hence, the very few studies exploring the impact of narratives conveying controversial attitudes are, in the context of our work, particularly interesting, for they empirically suggest that the narrative persuasion theoretical models might be generalizable to any type of persuasive content, including conspiracy beliefs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

2018

Self Cite

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Narrative persuasion, i.e., the impact of narratives on beliefs, behaviors and attitudes, and the mechanisms underpinning endorsement of conspiracy theories have both drawn substantial attention from social scientists. Yet, to date, these two fields have evolved separately, and to our knowledge no study has empirically examined the impact of conspiracy narratives on real-world conspiracy beliefs. In a first study, we exposed a group of participants (n = 37) to an X-Files episode before asking them to fill in a questionnaire related to their narrative experience and conspiracy beliefs. A control group (n = 41) had to answer the conspiracy beliefs items before watching the episode. Based on past findings of both the aforementioned fields of research, we hypothesized that the experimental group would show greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, an effect expected to be mediated by identification to the episodes' characters. We furthermore hypothesized that identification would be associated with cognitive elaboration of the topics developed in the narrative. The first two hypotheses were disproved since no narrative persuasion effect was observed. In a second study, we sought to replicate these results in a larger sample (n = 166). No persuasive effect was found in the new data and a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies strongly supports the absence of a positive effect of exposure to narrative material on endorsement of conspiracy theories. In both studies, a significant relation between conspiracy mentality and enjoyment was observed. In the second study, this relation was fully mediated by two dimensions of perceived realism, i.e., plausibility and narrative consistency. We discuss our results, based on theoretical models of narrative persuasion and compare our studies with previous narrative persuasion studies. Implications of these results for future research are also discussed.

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Stigmatized Beliefs: Conspiracy Theories, Anticipated Negative Evaluation of the Self, and Fear of Social Exclusion

Cited by 16 publications

References 59 publications

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

A "Conspiracy Theory" Conspiracy? A Mixed Methods Investigation of Laypeople's Rejection (and Acceptance) of a Controversial Label

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

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