2018
DOI: 10.1111/caje.12323
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Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement

Abstract: This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock‐based compensation on firms’ decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long‐ and short‐term vested stock‐based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short‐term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short‐term vested stock‐based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning ma… Show more

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