By the end of 2018 Turkey had entered a new economic crisis and a lengthy recession period. In contrast to the previous financial crises of 1994, 2001 and 2009, when the economy shrank abruptly with a spectacular collapse of asset values and a severe contraction of output, the 2018 economic crisis was characterized by a prolonged recession with persistent low (negative) rates of growth, dwindling investment performance, debt repayment problems, secularly rising unemployment, spiralling currency depreciation and high inflation. The mainstream approach attributes this dismal performance to a lack of 'structural reforms' and/or exogenous policy factors. However, this analysis shows that the underlying sources of the crisis are to be found not in the conjunctural cycles of reform fatigue, but rather in the post-2001, neoliberal, speculation-led growth model that relied excessively on hot-money inflows and external debt accumulation. This article argues that following the post-2001 orthodox reforms, a foreign capital inflow-dependent, debtled and construction-centred economic growth model dominated the economy and caused a long build-up of imbalances and increased fragilities that led to the 2018 crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic of 2020-21 further exposed these fragilities, pushing the economy back into a recession with rapid capital outflows causing another round of sharp currency depreciation. 2. 'Justice and Development Party' is the English translation of Turkey's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), founded in 2001 and in power continuously since the end of 2002. For historical reviews of the rise of the AKP see, for example, Esen and Gümüşçü (2016); Yeldan and Ünüvar (2016); Yılmaz and Bashirov (2018). 3. This model has variously been characterized as dependent financialization (Akçay and Güngen, 2019), deficit-led neoliberal populism (Güven, 2016), or a mix of neoliberal developmentalism and authoritarian populism (Adaman et al., 2019).