2020
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12581
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Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits

Abstract: The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading off the income effect relative to the standard electoral rewards … Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Community members and leaders in Northeast Brazil protest on the radio, visit city hall, and appeal to politicians, bureaucrats, or organizations to increase their chances (Medeiros 2012;Teixeira 2008). Though long-lasting water resources like cisterns reduce residents' reliance on clientelistic politicians (Bobonis et al 2022;Frey 2022), residents said they relied on association leaders and councilors to maintain essential services like wells, roadways, and lights.…”
Section: Public Servicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Community members and leaders in Northeast Brazil protest on the radio, visit city hall, and appeal to politicians, bureaucrats, or organizations to increase their chances (Medeiros 2012;Teixeira 2008). Though long-lasting water resources like cisterns reduce residents' reliance on clientelistic politicians (Bobonis et al 2022;Frey 2022), residents said they relied on association leaders and councilors to maintain essential services like wells, roadways, and lights.…”
Section: Public Servicesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Local politicians are able to monitor and reward declarations in part because they often cultivate clientelist relationships with citizens. In much of Brazil, these relationships build on mayors’ direct interactions with constituents, in addition to dense networks of operatives and brokers (Novaes, 2018; Frey, 2020). Amid weak political parties, local notables have long played an important intermediary role in Brazilian municipalities (Nunes Leal, 1949; Novaes, 2018), including city councilor candidates who often monitor declarations on behalf of allied mayoral candidates.…”
Section: Motivating Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…14 The nomination can be a highly competitive process that mobilizes a relatively high share of the population: even though many voters do not identify with a party in surveys, the party membership rate in Brazil is among the highest across democracies (10+% of voters). Recruitment is also highly concentrated in the year before local elections, often as a display of electoral strength by mayoral hopefuls (Frey 2020). These precandidates not only compete with other partisans for the candidacy but also with politicians from parties that are potential coalition members.…”
Section: Candidate Selection and Policy Making In Municipalitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%