Strategic ambiguity in the social sciences

Abstract

In the wake of the replication crisis, there have been calls to increase the clarity and precision of theory in the social sciences. Here, we argue that the effects of these calls may be limited due to incentives favoring ambiguous theory. Intentionally or not, scientists can exploit theoretical ambiguities to make support for a claim appear stronger than it is. Practices include theory stretching, interpreting an ambiguous claim more expansively to absorb data outside of the scope of the original claim, and post-hoc precision, interpreting an ambiguous claim more narrowly so it appears more precisely aligned with the data. These practices lead to the overestimation of evidence for the original claim and create the appearance of consistent support and progressive research programs, which may in turn be rewarded by journals, funding agencies, and hiring committees. Selection for ambiguous research can occur even when scientists act in good faith. Although ambiguity might be inevitable or even useful in the early stages of theory construction, scientists should aim for increased clarity as knowledge advances. Science benefits from transparently communicating about known ambiguities. To attain transparency about ambiguity, we provide a set of recommendations for authors, reviewers, and journals. We conclude with suggestions for research on how scientists use strategic ambiguity to advance their careers and the ways in which norms, incentives, and practices favor strategic ambiguity. Our paper ends with a simple mathematical model exploring the conditions in which high-ambiguity theories are favored over low-ambiguity theories, providing a basis for future analyses.

Formalizing theories of child development: Introduction to the special section

“…You might think: “I am no modeler, and never will be.” Nevertheless, you may help to improve the state of psychological theory in the area of child development. As an author, you can strive for clarity (Frankenhuis et al, 2023). Concretely, you might do this by interrogating your own ideas and inviting skeptics or modelers to poke holes in them.…”

“…Finally, modelers might exaggerate the scope of their work, as empirical researchers sometimes do. Being humans, modelers are also motivated to have an impact and thereby help themselves succeed (Frankenhuis et al, 2023). Intentionally or not, modelers might make claims that exceed the scope of their work to increase impact and thus advance their personal goals.…”

“…At the present time, few theories are clear and precise enough to cement findings into larger wholes. Most theories are stated in natural language, which is ambiguous—open to multiple interpretations—even if carefully crafted (Frankenhuis et al, 2023). Some ambiguities are unintentional; the authors are not aware of them or unable to increase clarity.…”

“…For instance, authors might ‘stretch’ theories to encompass data outside of their original scope (Rvachew, 2021) or ‘shrink’ theories to more precisely align with observed data. Both theory stretching and post‐hoc precision make the empirical evidence for a theoretical claim appear stronger than it actually is (Frankenhuis et al, 2023).…”

“…Unless transparently noted, theoretical ambiguity hurts scientific progress (Frankenhuis et al, 2023; Rohrer, 2021): verbal theories include vague concepts, implicit assumptions, and predictions based on intuitive reasoning rather than logical deduction. Such ambiguities leave ample room for disagreement about which predictions a theory makes, which data are well‐suited to testing a theory, and which patterns of data provide support for and against a theory (Fried, 2020).…”