Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts

Abstract

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision making at the trial level? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using a sample of district court cases from 1925 to 1996 that were subsequently reviewed by the courts of appeals, and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework, I discover that the district courts are constrained by the anticipated responses of the appeals courts. However, this conclusion is not apparent if one analyzes the data using traditional maximum likelihood methods. Only when empirical analyses specifically model underlying strategic relationships does one discover this constraint. If the federal trial judges anticipate a negative response on appeal, then they curtail their ideological influences (the magnitude of influence decreases by approximately one-half). This pattern remains consistent when one examines civil liberties and economic cases, but not for criminal cases. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary appears to exert a significant constraint on the district courts.

Delegation at the U.S. Federal Appellate Courts: The Power to Remand As a Double-Edged Sword

“…Posner 1993, Shavell 1995, Drahozal 1998, Shavell 2006, Levy 2005, Sarel 2017), empirical (e.g. Scott 2006, Randazzo 2008, Berlemann & Christmann 2016 and experimental papers (e.g. Feess & Sarel 2017, Lewisch et al 2015, which together provide a basis for the three different channels of effort cost, reputation and ideological preferences.…”

After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent

“…Both district court and circuit court judges generally comply with Supreme Court precedent that is clearly on point (for example, Kim 2007;Klein 2002;Songer and Sheehan 1990). Where application of a precedent is unclear, however, studies suggest that judges' own ideology (Boyd and Spriggs 2009;Sunstein et al 2006), their network of peer judges (Choi and Gulati 2008;Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2012), the composition of the panel with whom they sit (Sunstein et al 2006;Kim 2009), the presumed ideological preferences of reviewing courts ( Randazzo 2008;Westerland et al 2010), and changes in personnel on the Supreme Court (Benjamin and Vanberg 2016) all may play a role. There has been relatively little research into how lower courts implement Supreme Court decisions that overrule earlier decisions.…”

After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent

“…Both district court and circuit court judges generally comply with Supreme Court precedent that is clearly on point (for example, Kim 2007;Klein 2002;Songer and Sheehan 1990). Where application of a precedent is unclear, however, studies suggest that judges' own ideology (Boyd and Spriggs 2009;Sunstein et al 2006), their network of peer judges (Choi and Gulati 2008;Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2012), the composition of the panel with whom they sit (Sunstein et al 2006;Kim 2009), the presumed ideological preferences of reviewing courts ( Randazzo 2008;Westerland et al 2010), and changes in personnel on the Supreme Court (Benjamin and Vanberg 2016) all may play a role. There has been relatively little research into how lower courts implement Supreme Court decisions that overrule earlier decisions.…”