Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

Konrad, Kai A.

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.003.0002

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Konrad and Skaperdas (2012) apply these concepts to discuss the origin of the state. Konrad (2014) discusses the requirements for the emergence of alliances. Grossman (2004) discusses the circumstances that make peace among rival groups more complicated.…”

Section: Conflict Involving Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

Cruz

Torrens

2018

Econ Theory

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This paper develops a two-level model of internal and external conflict in which the paradox of power holds for internal conflict, but not for external conflict. In the model, internal conflict is imbedded in a situation of external conflict. Agents in a group fight over the distribution of resources within the group, but they cooperate to fight against other groups. Agents with low economic productivity have an advantage in the internal conflict game because they face a lower opportunity cost for investments in weapons. However, it is easier for more productive groups to mobilize resources for external conflict, and as a result they have an advantage over less productive groups. The model helps to explain why economically unproductive individuals may enjoy high living standards relative to more productive ones, but more developed groups usually defeat and conquer less developed ones. An extension of the model shows that groups with more unequal distribution of productivity might have an advantage in external conflict. The model can also be extended to study the effects of trade on the intensity of the paradox of power and income distribution within and across groups.We would like to thank Sebastian Galiani, Jorge Streb, the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. We would also like to thank the Ostrom Workshop for its financial support.

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Section: Conflict Involving Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

Cruz

Torrens

2018

Econ Theory

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“…The formation of alliances has many aspects and has been studied in an extensive literature in economics (see Konrad for a survey), political science (see, e.g., Morrow ; Fordham and Poast for surveys and views) and in biology (see Bissonnette et al for a survey). The formation of a coalition or an alliance often changes many things, compared to stand‐alone play: players may enjoy fighting synergies (Kovenock and Roberson ; Skaperdas ), may overcome budgetary limitations (Konrad and Kovenock ) or create a distributional conflict between them (Esteban and Sákovics ; Katz and Tokatlidu ; Konrad ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Deter or to Moderate? Alliance Formation in Contests With Incomplete Information

Konrad

Morath

2017

Economic Inquiry

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We consider two players' choice about the formation of an alliance ahead of conflict in a framework with incomplete information about the strength of the potential ally. When deciding on alliance formation, players anticipate the self‐selection of other players and the informational value of own and other players' choices. In the absence of these signaling effects, strong players have an incentive to stand alone, which leads to a separating equilibrium. This separating equilibrium can be destabilized by deception incentives if beliefs are updated on the basis of endogenous alliance formation choices. Weak players may find it attractive to appear strong in order to deter competitors from positive effort choices. Strong players may find it attractive to appear weak in order to give their competitors a false sense of security and then beat them with little effort. Moreover, appearing weak allows players to free‐ride when alliances are formed. (JEL D72, D74)

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Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets

Konrad

Morath

2022

Defence and Peace Economics

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Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

Cited by 6 publications

References 31 publications

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

To Deter or to Moderate? Alliance Formation in Contests With Incomplete Information

Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets

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