Strategic Candidacy via Endogenous Commitment

Japanese Economic Review

2014

This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72.

supporting

confidence: 70%

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal

Japanese Economic Review

2014

“…Therefore, I include these in the current term as the cost of betrayal. In addition, Aragone`s et al ( 2007), Harrington (1993), and Ishihara (2012) show that, in a repeated game, nonbinding platforms can be completely binding in equilibrium. 8.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?

Journal of Theoretical Politics

2014

This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about candidates' policy preferences. If voters believe that a candidate is likely to be extreme, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium: an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate, with some probability, and approaches the median policy with the remaining probability. Although an extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate candidate, regardless of imitation or approach, partial pooling ensures that voters prefer an extreme candidate who does not pretend to be moderate over an uncertain candidate who announces an extreme platform. As a result, a moderate candidate never has a higher probability of winning than an extreme candidate.

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises Vis-a-Vis Cost of Betrayal

2013

SSRN Journal

This study examines and models the e¤ects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that di¤ers from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyze endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had di¢ culty with. First, candidates with di¤erent characteristics have di¤erent probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.