Strategic Challenger Entry in a Federal System: The Role of Economic and Political Conditions in State Legislative Competition

Abstract

Over a third of state legislators do not face challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State legislators—particularly members of the governor's party—more often face opposition during weak state economies, but the president's copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national‐ and state‐level political conditions have an important impact on challengers' entry strategies.

Electoral Accountability for State Legislative Roll Calls and Ideological Representation

“…In some states, such as Wyoming or Alabama, more than 85% of legislators represented these types of safe districts. Partisan districts provide an electoral cushion for incumbents and are partly responsible for approximately 40% of incumbents avoiding major party challengers (Squire 2000; Rogers 2015). Challengers are not only necessary to provide voters an opportunity to replace their incumbent but can also bring unrepresentative legislative behavior to voters’ attention (Arnold 1992).…”

The Impact of Nonpartisan Fiscal Institutions on Budgetary Delay

“…Despite the potential for electoral sanctions after a budget is late, lawmakers seem unconcerned with delayed budgets during an election year (Cummins 2012). Despite a long literature in legislative politics arguing that distributive benefits directly affect lawmakers’ electoral outcomes (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990; Finocchiaro and Jenkins 2016), fear of electoral reprisal may be reduced since state legislators are reelected at exceedingly high rates and therefore lawmakers may not feel pressure to reach a budgetary compromise (Rogers 2015). This finding has important implications for electoral accountability because a cornerstone of democracy is the mass public’s evaluation of elected officials’ performance (Healy and Malhotra 2013).…”

States Testing the Legal Limits: The Effect of Electoral Competition on the Constitutionality of State Statutes

“…In particular, the role of interest groups and the influence of political parties and state legislative campaign techniques have evolved noticeably across time and within states. Furthermore, the electorate has become increasingly partisan over time, and this could affect some aspects of state elections and legislative behavior (Rogers 2015). It is highly likely that the relationship we observe could vary over time and within a state.…”

“…State legislators may respond to their constituents’ policy preferences partially out of fear of potential electoral sanctions for taking a wrong policy position (Birkhead 2015; Gamm and Kousser 2010). Although all elected officials who neglect their constituents could potentially pay a price at the ballot box, the risk may be even greater for an incumbent in a political environment where a challenger can more easily arise and offer their version of how the current office holder has erred (Arnold 1990; Hogan 2008; Rogers 2015). Consequently, legislators under heavy electoral pressure may sometimes support policies—including laws that do not rest on clearly established constitutional principles—that they believe may please their constituents or that might hopefully stymie the emergence of a challenger in the next election.…”