Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than under full information. However, the scope of redistribution is less sensitive towards the degree of uncertainty than predicted. For all degrees of uncertainty, we find a coexistence of libertarianism and redistribution as well as incomplete sorting, so that heterogeneous redistribution communities turn out to be sustainable. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: C910, D020, D630, H240, K000.

Justice Under Uncertainty

“…3 Importantly, this third-party impartiality procedure is not equivalent to the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" (Rawls 1971), because spectators' earnings in the experiment are completely unrelated to their allocation decisions. We deliberately did not choose a "behind the veil of ignorance" approach because it has been shown that the type of uncertainty entailed by the veil of ignorance influences individuals' allocation behavior by introducing insurance purposes (Aguiar et al 2010, Schildberg-Hörisch 2010 and strategic considerations (Gerber et al 2014). there is no uncertainty for both recipients, we expect all spectators to choose the equal split. However, will this also be the case when a recipient is exposed to uncertainty?…”

When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?

“…In contrast with dictator and ultimatum games, there is no obvious "fair" ex-post allocation of payoffs in our model, 8 pro-social behavior at the constitutional stage cannot be exclusively attributed to concerns about the fairness. 9 Indeed, our results 8 For recent experiments on fairness concerns and voting, see, e.g., Gerber et al (2013) and Hoechtl et al (2012). 9 Implementing the simple majority rule maximizes the aggregate payoffs in a given round and might hence be preferred by players with efficiency preferences.…”

“… 8 For recent experiments on fairness concerns and voting, see, e.g., Gerber et al (2013) and Hoechtl et al (2012). …”

Justice under Uncertainty

“…We deliberately did not choose a 'behind the veil of ignorance' approach because it has been shown that the type of uncertainty entailed by the veil of ignorance influences individuals' allocation behavior by introducing insurance purposes (Aguiar et al 2010, Schildberg-Hörisch 2010 and strategic considerations (Gerber et al 2014). equal split. However, will this also be the case when a recipient is exposed to uncertainty?…”