Strategic Coalition Formation in Global Public Good Provision

A paradox of coalition building in public good provision

“…While our study does not consider coalition stability, i.e., the participation/withdrawal decision of countries to join/leave a coalition, it analyzes the linkage between the endogenous coalition formation decision by an exogenously given group of pioneering benevolent countries (i.e., the profitability issue), on the one hand, and the strategic incentives for agents outside the coalition to adopt better technologies for public good provision, on the other. Sequential games of coalition formation or, equivalently, dissolution have also been considered by Buchholz and Eichenseer (2017) and Foucart and Wan (2018), respectively. These papers not only identify conditions (such as group size or preference intensity for the public good) under which a group of agents is willing to act cooperatively (or starting from an existing coalition or federation to decentralize the contribution decisions) but also examine the incentives for one group to act cooperatively if another group has already formed a coalition.…”

Public goods and public bads

“…For an analysis of coalition formation in a standard public good economy without depleters, seeHattori (2015) andBuchholz and Eichenseer (2017).…”