Strategic Constituency Manipulation in State Legislative Redistricting

Abstract

Scholars often identify gerrymanders by examining changes to districts' partisan composition. However, advantages can also be gained by systematically varying the extent to which incumbents' constituencies remain the same. In this article, I examine the post‐2000 redistricting in 22 state legislatures. I find that parties, particularly in legislatures with low turnover levels, gain advantages from constituency manipulation, but that these advantages are counteracted by geographic redistricting regulations. Lastly, I find that ostensibly bipartisan outcomes nonetheless feature partisan constituency manipulation. These findings echo a growing literature that analyzes the geographic aspects of gerrymandering and highlight how turnover patterns motivate redistricting strategies.

Boundaries, Redistricting Criteria, and Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives

“…Hayes, Hibbing, & Sulkin, 2010;Stratmann, 2000). Mapmakers know these effects and manipulate boundary lines strategically to enhance or weaken such connections (Makse, 2012b; and influence candidate emergence and electoral competition (Yoshinaka & Murphy, 2011). Clearly, the placement of district boundaries can have electoral and representational consequences beyond the partisan and racial distribution of voters; how boundary lines group and divide the population into various districts has the potential to structure relationships between legislators and constituents.…”

The Redistricting Cycle, Partisan Tides, and Party Strategy in State Legislative Elections

“… 13. In some ways, the distinction between legislative and non-legislative control obscures important variations in a party’s control over the redistricting process. In particular, divided government, the presence of backup institutions, and the presence of strict statutory redistricting rules can prevent a party from maximizing redistricting gains (Makse 2012; Winburn 2008). Alternative specifications, however, fail to detect robust differences between states with more constrained and less constrained redistricting institutions. …”