Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration

Planer-Friedrich, Lisa; Sahm, Marco

doi:10.1007/s00712-019-00663-x

Cited by 58 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 62 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…28 In this study, we focused on the case of imperfectly compatible network, because the analysis in the case of perfectly incompatible network is substantially the same as that given in Chirco and Scrimitore (2013). 29 Some existing works on corporate social responsibility, including Kopel and Brand (2013) and Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2020), have assumed that a corporate social responsibility firm maximizes a linear combination between its profit and consumer surplus. 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

Nakamura

2020

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations-active and passive-as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

Nakamura

2020

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, the factor k could be in principle different across firms. However, following a vast literature (e.g., Fanti & Buccella, ; Kopel & Brand, ; Lambertini, Palestini, & Tampieri, ; Lambertini & Tampieri, ; Lambertini & Tampieri, , and Planer‐Friedrich & Sahm, ), we assume that the value of k is common for all the firms that operate within the industry. Thus, the CSR objective function ( W ) is

W_{i} = π_{i} + italickCS = ((), a - q_{i} - q_{j}) q_{i} + k \frac{{((), q_{i} + q_{j})}^{2}}{2},

where k ∈ [0,1] denotes the weight that CSR firm assigns to consumer surplus.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

Fanti

Buccella

2019

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.

show abstract

“…Making the firm's payoff, Π ( x , α ) an increasing function of output via the component G ( x ) is compatible with the notion that the firm's objective increases with consumer surplus or social welfare (cf., Goering, , ; Kopel & Brand, ; Kopel, Lamantia, & Szidarovszky, ; Lambertini, Palestini, & Tampieri, ; Matsumura & Ogawa, ; Planer‐Friedrich & Sahm, ; Willner, ). In this case, and assuming linear demand, G xx > 0 would hold .…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance

Goerke

2018

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We theoretically analyse the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance of an oligopolistic firm. The firm maximizes a weighted sum of profits and a CSR objective that depends on output and the firm's contribution to public good provision, that is, tax payments. Making one CSR element more important induces the firm to adhere less to the other and to reduce tax avoidance. Hence, simultaneously a substitutive and a complementary relationship between CSR and tax avoidance can be observed. Therefore, using composite indicators of CSR prevents an empirical identification of this linkage.Moreover, if tax avoidance declines, CSR activities will increase. Consequently, the overall link between CSR and tax avoidance is theoretically ambiguous.

show abstract

Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration

Cited by 58 publications

References 62 publications

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About