Strategic democratic legitimation

Abstract

This chapter lays out the theoretical framework for the study of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs). First, it argues that IPIs display few of the functional benefits that are commonly associated with the delegation of competences to international institutions. Second, it claims that the assumption of normatively committed member states of international organizations (IOs) does not explain either the weakness of IPIs, their appearance in many IOs composed of non-democratic states, or their absence from IOs with a solid democratic membership. Third, we suggest that the creation and empowerment of IPIs is better understood as a legitimation strategy that governments employ strategically in response to challenges to the legitimacy of the organization. Maintaining or improving the legitimacy of an IO is important because it enhances the stability of cooperation and prevents the disruption of its operation, and international parliamentarization is specifically useful when democratic legitimacy is the standard by which relevant audiences judge an IO. Finally, we identify six structural conditions that generate variation in the normative cost–benefit calculus of governments. These relate to institutional characteristics of the IO itself (authority, purpose, and scope), as well as its domestic and international environment (democracy, governance failure, and diffusion).

Do international parliaments matter? An empirical analysis of influences on foreign policy and civil rights

“…The research presented in this article is relevant to this debate. With a few notable exceptions, the IPIs covered in this study have very limited legislative powers (Cofelice, 2018; Schimmelfennig et al, 2020). However, the evidence we presented suggests that this does not condemn them to irrelevance in relation to the positions promoted by governments on global issues.…”

“…The first reason is theoretical: the causal mechanisms producing impact may differ substantially between the two types and it seems preferable to conduct separate analyses. While the vast majority of IPIs has at most consultative powers in relation to IGOs (Cofelice, 2018; Schimmelfennig et al, 2020) and any effect is likely to stem from socialization mechanisms, including free-standing associations alongside formal organs would increase the heterogeneity of the possible channels of influence. The second reason is practical: we can infer the membership in international parliamentary organs from information about the membership in the IGO to which they are constitutionally linked, which we obtained from the International Governmental Organizations Dataset of the Correlates of War (COW) project (Pevehouse et al, 2020).…”

“…Fifth, we checked whether our results change if we take into account differences in the institutional design of IPIs (Cofelice, 2018; Winzen and Rocabert, 2021). This exercise is made possible by the new data on design features included in the International Parliamentary Institutions Dataset (Schimmelfennig et al, 2020). We modified joint ipi memberships to give more weight to IPIs that can provide more opportunities for interaction and discussion among members of parliament from different countries, because of the following features: delegates are organized in ideological rather than national groupings, IPI rules stipulate that it should meet for 1 week every year or more, and the IPI has autonomy from outside actors in relation to their agenda, meetings and internal organization.…”

“…Habegger, 2010; Jančić, 2015). Empirical research has shown that the creation of IPIs resulted from ‘a legitimation strategy that governments employ strategically when the IO’s core constituencies perceive the organization to be failing on this count’ (Schimmelfennig et al, 2020: 41; see also Cofelice, 2018; Grigorescu, 2015; and, on the uses of democracy as legitimizing principle, Dingwerth et al, 2019, 2020). This raises the question: does this legitimation strategy work?…”

“…First, much is now known about which IPIs exist and about the similarities and differences in their institutional design (Alger and Kille, 2014; Cofelice, 2015, 2018; Cutler, 2001; De Puig, 2008; Habegger, 2005; Kissling, 2014; Winzen and Rocabert, 2021). Second, recent studies have given us in-depth knowledge of the reasons why IPIs are created and empowered (Cofelice, 2018; Grigorescu, 2015; Lenz, 2019; Lenz et al, 2019; Rocabert et al, 2019; Schimmelfennig et al, 2020; Verdoes, 2020; Winzen and Rocabert, 2021). Third, there are systematic explanations of why individual members of national parliaments engage with IPIs (Lipps, 2021; Malang, 2019; Wagner, 2013).…”