Strategic Diversion in Political Communication

Abstract

This study shows how an informed advisor can use selective information revelation to divert the agenda of a decision maker. An advisor is likely to employ diversion when the decision maker is restricted in the scope of her actions by time, resource, or institutional constraints. The incentive for diversion and the suspicion it engenders in the decision maker reduce the amount of information that can be conveyed by an advisor in two important ways: (1) by expanding the strategic conditions under which no information can be conveyed and (2) by reducing the strategic conditions under which complete information can be conveyed.This study shows how an informed advisor can selectively reveal private information in order to divert the agenda of a decision maker. For example, a lobbyist or bureaucrat armed with policy expertise on two issues might "be selective in the evidence he offers" (Ferkiss 1971) in order to induce the legislature to pursue the lobbyist's or bureaucrat's agenda, rather than the legislature's own salient issue (Deakin 1966;Milbrath 1963;Schlozman and Tierney 1986;Smith 1993). A politician faced with a scandal might release a new policy initiative, while ignoring questions about the scandal, in order to generate coverage of an issue that puts the politician in a more favorable light (see, e.g., Bavelis et al. 1990;Bowers, Elliott, and Desmond 1977;Clayman 2001;Kurtz 1998). And a local informant with valuable knowledge about the location of a common enemy in two possible areas might reveal only one of these locations to a military commander in order to lead the commander into action that promotes the informant's own strategic interests-e.g., with respect to his other rivals-above the objectives of the military official (Conetta 2002;Filkins 2002;Sengupta 2001). In many other cases as well, advisors with expertise on two or more issues can sometimes reveal their information selectively (e.g., on one issue but not the other) in order to divert the attention of a decision maker-e.g., voter, reporter, bureaucrat-away from the decision maker's own salient issue to an issue that is more favorable to the advisor.Opportunities for strategic diversion can arise whenever a decision maker cannot act on all issues at once. This study shows how this incentive for diversion reduces the amount of information that can be conveyed by an informed

Knowledge Exchange Processes in Organizations and Policy Arenas: A Narrative Systematic Review of the Literature

“…Third, although our review is not focused on the individual level, the actual capacity of a given actor to influence thought, practices, or rules is highly dependent on his or her rhetorical abilities (Majone 1989; Russell et al 2008; Van de Ven and Schomaker 2002) and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1980, 1981, 1984a, 2001). Finally, in interpreting the definition, we should keep in mind that at the collective level, knowledge plays a central role in the processes by which issues are problematized, conceptualized, and prioritized, something described in political science as agenda setting (Austen‐Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Considine 1998; Haas 1992; Kingdon 1984; Larocca 2004; Lewis and Considine 1999; Oh and Rich 1996; Smith 1995).…”

“…Nevertheless, this view is not shared by the political science literature, for which a polarized context is the normal state of affairs. In the lobbying tradition, the way in which divergences in opinions, preferences, and interests are organized explains (1) the extent of involvement in knowledge exchange activities (Ainsworth 1993; Baumgartner and Leech 1996; Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004; Epstein and Ohalloran 1995; Larocca 2004; Sloof and Van Winden 2000), (2) the structure and shape of knowledge exchange networks (Browne 1990; Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Heclo 1978; Heinz et al 1993), and (3) the content of the information exchanged (Austen‐Smith and Wright 1992; Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Phillips and Phillips 1984). In the policy network tradition, polarization is also the core variable explaining the network's shape ( Jordan and Maloney 1997; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1999; Klijn 1996; Knoepfel and Kissling‐Naf 1998; Konig and Brauninger 1998; Rhodes 1990).…”

“…The idea that knowledge has both a cost and a value was used by Bardach to suggest that knowledge will reach those “for whom the utility of having it exceeds the disutility of obtaining it” (1984, 126). Although this statement is highly rationalist in essence, a widely shared, broader assumption in the literature is that producers (Amara, Ouimet, and Landry 2004; Landry, Amara, and Lamari 2001a; Landry, Lamari, and Amara 2003), intermediaries (Austen‐Smith and Wright 1992; Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2003; Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson 2004; Larocca 2004; Olson 1965), and users (Black 2001; Campbell et al 2009; Harries, Elliott, and Higgins 1999; Jacobson, Butterill, and Goering 2005; Knott and Wildavsky 1980) all invest their energy and resources in knowledge exchange processes to the extent that they perceive this investment to be profitable. This, in turn, translates into encouragement for the implementation of institutional incentive schemes to increase use (e.g., for producers, tagged grant money or institutional recognition, and for users, either allocated time or favorable organizational rules, procedures, norms, and culture) (Campbell et al 2009; Lomas 1990, 1993a, 2000; Mitton et al 2007; Weiss 1978).…”

Evaluation models and evaluation use

“…On the other hand, the literature rooted in political science takes a high level of polarization as a given. In this perspective, the way in which the system is polarized is the key to understanding the nature of ongoing coalitions (Carpenter et al, 2004; Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Heclo, 1978; Heinz et al, 1993; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Kickert et al, 1999; Klijn, 1996; Rhodes, 1990), the level of involvement of the various actors (Ainsworth, 1993; Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Coglianese et al, 2004; Epstein and Ohalloran, 1995; Larocca, 2004; Sloof and Van Winden, 2000) and the content of the information exchanged (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; Phillips and Phillips, 1984). This tallies with observations made in the field of evaluation about the influence of ideological proximity on knowledge exchange processes (Caplan, 1979; Havelock, 1969; Weiss, 1977b, 1983; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980a, 1980b).…”

Lester Milbrath’s The Washington Lobbyists, 50 Years On: An Enduring Legacy

“…• Storytelling: Milbrath recognizes that the effective lobbyist must be skilled at shaping the priorities of policymakers, through the persuasive presentation of information (Larocca, 2004). Agenda setting may be where a lobbyist is most influential in the policymaking process (King et al, 2005).…”