Strategic Entry Interactions Involving Profit-Maximising and Labour-Managed Firms
            
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Stewart, Geoff

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042017

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Introduction2

A Model Of Labour-managed Firm Entry1

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Cited by 30 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…There may also be differences between LM and profit-maximising firms in a strategic setting. See, for example, Stewart (1991), Cremer and Crémer (1992), Ireland and Stewart (1995), Neary and Ulph (1997). 11 For a theoretical and empirical analysis of the choice of strategy, see Gans et al (2002).…”

Section: A Model Of Labour-managed Firm Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why is labour-managed firm entry so rare?

Podivinsky

Stewart

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Section: A Model Of Labour-managed Firm Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why is labour-managed firm entry so rare?

Podivinsky

Stewart

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…1 There are many excellent studies such as Svejnar (1982), Stewart (1991Stewart ( , 1992, Cremer and Crémer (1992), Delbono and Rossini (1992), Drago and Turnbull (1992), Futagami and Okamura (1996), Askildsen and Ireland (1993), Zhang (1993), Haruna (1996), Neary and Ulph (1997), Lambertini and Rossini (1998), and Lambertini (2001). Furthermore, the analysis of mixed market models that incorporate social-welfare-maximizing public firms has received increasing attention in recent years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Commitment and International Mixed Competition with Domestic State-owned and Foreign Labor-managed Firms

Ohnishi¹

2008

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This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-perworker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be increased, but cannot be reduced. Hence, the firm's capacity cost is sunk and changes from a variable cost to a fixed cost. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses its actual output. The paper shows the equilibrium of the international mixed model.

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“…However, these analyses have a common character; that is, they are based on a one-shot game framework. Stewart (1991) investigates the strategic entry deterrence problem (see Dixit (1979Dixit ( , 1980) by analyzing the case in which a profit-maximizing firm tries to enter an industry where a monopoly labor-managed firm already operates. He shows that the labormanaged firm could have an extreme excess capacity in order to deter entry (see also Zhang (1993) and Haruna (1996)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%