Strategic Experimentation

Bolton, Patrick; Harris, Christopher

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00022

Cited by 473 publications

(372 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…This result is in line with the results in classic two-armed bandit problems, in which information is also nonmonotonic in beliefs (see Jensen (1983) and Bolton and Harris (1999), for example). Now that I have defined the firm's problem and can solve for the optimal policy rule under an ASG, I consider the efficiency of the rate of adoption.…”

Section: Analysis Of the Firm's Problemsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…In Rob (1991), the planner always weakly experiments more than firms do in a market equilibrium. Further, Bolton and Harris (1999) show that firms working as a team experiment to a larger extent than firms acting individually at any point in time. This proposition builds upon these results by demonstrating that firms underexperiment relative to the planner in the initial period and when summing over all periods of the model.…”

Section: The Social Planner's Problemmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The first is the field of social learning. I use a framework close to Bolton and Harris (1999), who examine a multiperiod, multiplayer two-armed bandit problem and explore the strategic interactions among agents. As they did in their paper, I try to answer the same basic questions about the speed and diffusion of information among agents, but I do using an environment with heterogeneous beliefs and without strategic effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Learning Dynamics with Private and Public Signals

Copeland

2006

Economic Theory

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This paper studies the evolution of firms' beliefs in a dynamic model of technology adoption. Firms play a simple variant of the classic two-armed bandit problem, where one arm represents a known, deterministic production technology and the other arm an unknown, stochastic technology. Firms learn about the unknown technology by observing both private and public signals. I find that because of the externality associated with the public signal, the evolution of beliefs under a market equilibrium can differ significantly from that under a planner. In particular, firms experiment earlier under the planner than they do under the market equilibrium and thus firms under the planner generate more information at the start of the model. This intertemporal effect brings about the unusual result that, on a per period basis, there exist cases where firms in a market equilibrium over-experiment relative to the planner in the latter periods of the model. *

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Section: Analysis Of the Firm's Problemsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: The Social Planner's Problemmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Learning Dynamics with Private and Public Signals

Copeland

2006

Economic Theory

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“…Perhaps more relevant to typecasting based on past work are screening models such as those presented by Greenwald (1986), McCormick (1990), and Gibbons and Katz (1991), who respectively describe the scarring or stigmatizing implications of job-changing, acceptance of unskilled work during periods of unemployment, and discretionary lay-offs. In addition, the "bandit models" studied by statisticians (Berry and Fristedt 1985) and introduced into economics by Rothschild (1974;see also Schmalensee 1975;McCall and McCall 1987;Bolton and Harris 1999) are germane here because they posit rational limits to the process of experimentation by which decisionmakers (e.g., employers) attempt to discern the underlying quality of their options. 12 However, while these limited information models are consistent with our framework, it might still be the case that true skill differences fully account for any observed relationship between typecasting and opportunities for future work.…”

Section: Typecast or Specialist?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust Identities or Nonentities? Typecasting in the Feature‐Film Labor Market

Zuckerman¹,

Kim²,

Ukanwa³

et al. 2003

American Journal of Sociology

465

373

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seminar participants at the Columbia and University of Chicago business schools for guidance and feedback. We take full responsibility for remaining errors. Robust Identities or Non-Entities?Typecasting in the Feature Film Labor Market AbstractWe provide a framework for reconciling two seemingly incompatible claims regarding identity in social and economic arenas: (a) that complex, multivalent identities are advantageous because they afford greater flexibility; and (b) that simple, generic identities are advantageous because they facilitate interpretation by key audiences. Following Faulkner (1983), we argue that these claims do not conflict with one another but that they apply to different contexts. A generic identity is helpful in gaining the recognition necessary for sustained participation in a social arena. However, as one becomes better established, the limitations entailed by a simple, "typecast" identity increasingly rival the benefits. We test these hypotheses in an analysis of the labor market for actors in the feature film industry. Interviews with key informants and analysis of comprehensive data from the Internet Movie Database support the proposed theoretical framework. In addition, the evidence supports the salience of the hypothesized typecasting processes even in the presence of related processes based on underlying skill differences and social networks. Our results have important implications for research on identity formation in various social arenas, categorical boundaries in external labor markets, and more generally, the interplay between actor and position inherent in market dynamics. Robust Identities or Non-Entities?

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“…Because "pessimistic"researchers cannot access the private information of more optimistic agents, they give up early in the race or even fail to join it. From the standpoint of an observer holding fully shared (complete) information, the more pessimistic 2 In the strategic multi-armed bandit literature (Bolton andHarris 1999, Cripps, Rady andKeller 2003), equilibrium experimentation is sub-optimal, but this is only because players cannot conceal their …ndings from each other. Under-experimentation merely of the underprovision of a public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%