Strategic forum selection and compliance in interstate dispute resolution

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic forum selection approaches and compliance with interstate dispute resolution settlements. Research shows that (a) management design features, like decision control and international organizations, affect compliance, (b) states strategically select among bilateral and third-party fora, and (c) anticipated settlement outcomes and enforcement inform pre-negotiation stages. A skeptical perspective suggests that states only select management approaches when they are confident in their ability to fully cooperate. Using Issue Correlates of War data, I test an endogenous model of forum selection and compliance. Statistical analysis finds that states strategically select management approaches in two cases: state-led mediation and ad hoc arbitration. Closer analysis suggests that, rather than tempering the promotion of mediation's and arbitration's pacifying benefits, conflict management scholarship should investigate more comparisons across dispute resolution approaches. This project's multidimensional framework reveals that mediation and arbitration share similar foundations that logically link their selection and inclination toward compliance.

Examining conflict management technique sequences in international claims

“…Because of their legal nature, arbitration and adjudication do not require any decision-making power to be held by the states once they enter the process; conflict is settled with reference to the law. Nevertheless, they can allow for non-legal agreement (see also Lefler 2015). Gent and Shannon (2010) find here that binding settlements are more effective than nonbinding third-party negotiations in ending territorial claims.…”

Can the Rational Design of International Institutions Solve Cooperation Problems? Insights from a Systematic Literature Review

“…As they are deeply rooted in economics, these econometric models were certainly not accidentally used in the examined rationalist empirical works. Both logistic regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) methods were the second most frequently used methods in the examined literature [63,77,80,86,87]. Third, a chi-square test and a cross-tabulation analysis were each performed once each [79,83].…”

“…Tir and Stinnett [90], Jo and Namgung [81], Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth [79] and Lefler [87] conduct studies that deal with CENTRALIZATION. All of these researchers vaguely explore Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal's [2] conjectures, but their conclusions inherently contribute to the examined debate.…”

“…Such research, placed within the consequences approach, concludes with the need to include contingent factors such as preferences and domestic regimes when analyzing IO efficacy. Finally, Lefler's [87] (p. 93) analysis of international organizations focuses on diverse approaches to dispute resolution based on control, transparency, and elements of distributional bias. It examines why states strategically select mediation or arbitration for conflict management.…”

Why Not Bargain? The Domestic Politics of Utilizing the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism

“…Existing studies also posit that democratic leaders whose survival is subject to electoral outcomes are especially vulnerable to domestically unpopular outcomes of international bargaining. Thus, democracies have a greater need for political cover (Lefler, 2015). The signaling effect of the prudence of the compromise may also be stronger among democratic disputants as citizens are accustomed to third-party involvement in domestic disputes (Melin, 2013).…”