Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition

Chalioti, Evangelia; Serfes, Konstantinos

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.004

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Finally, this paper also brings a contribution to the theoretical literature studying the interaction between product market competition and managerial compensation (Chalioti, 2015;Chalioti & Serfes, 2017;Etro & Cella, 2013;Piccolo et al, 2008;Raith, 2003, among others). In most of these works the focus is on agency conflicts due to moral hazard problems, whereas in our analysis the interaction between competition and innovation is studied within a principalagent model with hidden knowledge and the results are driven by the crucial assumption that the distribution of firm's types is endogenous and depends on the outcome of the R&D process.…”

mentioning

confidence: 88%

R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information

Romano

2021

Southern Economic Journal

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Within a principal-agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand-enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, but also relative to its supplier, a contractual cost arises which neutralizes the standard strategic benefit of R&D and reduces the incentives to invest. Moreover, within this setting, more intense competition always stifles innovation.

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confidence: 88%

R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information

Romano

2021

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Such a representation is a natural choice as it reflects the established relations among the firms and allows the application of standard fair division methods for sharing the collective transaction cost, among the members of the institution 7 . As a first step, we use graph-theoretic notions to determine a realistic characteristic function for the game-theoretic representation of industrial symbiosis.…”

Section: Modeling Multiagent Industrial Symbiosis Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For such a purpose, we rely on the rich literature on norm-aware coordination [41,12,39] and address open problems related to organizational characterization [11] of multiagent industrial symbiosis. To that end, cost allocation and incentive engineering techniques can be employed as a financial instrument for nudging the collective behavior and to ensure the compliance of firms to contractual commitments [1,7].…”

Section: Conclusion and Open Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics and Allocation of Transaction Cost in Multiagent Industrial Symbiosis

Yazdanpanah,

Yazan,

Zijm

2020

Preprint

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This paper discusses the dynamics of Transaction Cost (TC) in Industrial Symbiosis Institutions (ISI) and provides a fair and stable mechanism for TC allocation among the involved firms in a given ISI. In principle, industrial symbiosis, as an implementation of the circular economy paradigm in the context of industrial relation, is a practice aiming at reducing the material/energy footprint of the firm. The well-engineered form of this practice is proved to decrease the transaction costs at a collective level. This can be achieved using information systems for: identifying potential synergies, evaluating mutually beneficial ones, implementing the contracts, and governing the behavior of the established relations. Then the question is "how to distribute the costs for maintaining such an information system in a fair and stable manner?" We see such a cost as a collective transaction cost and employ an integrated method rooted in cooperative game theory and multiagent systems research to develop a fair and stable allocation mechanism for it. The novelty is twofold: in developing analytical multiagent methods for capturing the dynamics of transaction costs in industrial symbiosis and in presenting a novel game-theoretic mechanism for its allocation in industrial symbiosis institutions. While the former contributes to the theories of industrial symbiosis (methodological contribution), the latter supports decision makers aiming to specify fair and stable industrial symbiosis contracts (practical contribution).

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