Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers

Zhao, Daozhi; Chen, Mingyang; Gong, Yeming

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035

Cited by 28 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…According to the enormous growth of e-commerce, Wei, Li, Gou, and Huo (2019) designed a model based on both revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contracts. Zhao, Chen, and Gong (2019) proposed a conditional probability of the market situation. Authors considering an SC including two retailers(downstream) and a mutual manufacturer (upstream) used revenue-sharing coordination contracts for information sharing.…”

Section: Revenue-sharing Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Introducing a novel revenue-sharing contract in media supply chain management using data mining and multi-criteria decision-making methods

2022

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In recent years, we have observed stunning advances in supply chain coordination. But despite all these scientific methods, some of the businesses are still coordinating traditionally. Media supply chain, and above all its components, the cinema industry has been coordinated traditionally for years. One of the boldest problems in the media supply chain is wage determination in the cinema industry, which in it the actor's efficiency or deficiency is not considered. It means the success or failure of the movie is nothing to do with the actor's revenue. To address this problem, this article proposes a novel revenue-sharing coordination contract that benefits from text mining and the best-worst method. We aim to determine a fair share of profit or loss of a movie for each of its actors based on their performance and efficiency on the success or failure of the project. One of the latest movies is considered as a case study, and its lead actor's wage for this movie is determined under this contract. The sentiment analysis technique investigated the viewers' opinions about the movie and the actor's performance. Since the reviewers mainly are the people who have no expertise in cinematography, they cannot discern the influence of other participants on the actor's performance. So the proposed method used experts' opinions through the fuzzy DEMATEL method to consider the overlapping effect besides enhancing the validity of the reviewers' opinions.

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Section: Revenue-sharing Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…•The essence of this study is renewable energy power pricing under uncertain supply and demand (Zhao et al, 2019). • • Revenue-sharing is used for coordinating the SC to information sharing.…”

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confidence: 99%

Introducing a novel revenue-sharing contract in media supply chain management using data mining and multi-criteria decision-making methods

2022

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“…Cai et al [39] proposed an improved contract based on revenue sharing that allows members to share profits and implement alternative contracts to coordinate a vendor-managed inventory supply chain with service-level sensitive customers. Zhao [40] explored collusion and information sharing in a supply chain consisting of two downstream retailers and a mutual upstream manufacturer with the coordination by a revenue sharing contract. In practice, similar to the marketing effort opportunity cost, it would be difficult for the OTA to verify the hotels' own channel revenues, which will create an additional information cost for the whole system.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination Contracts for Hotels and Online Travel Agents

et al. 2020

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Herein, we address a common problem of hotels in the current world of online selling, namely the management of relationships with third party resellers (also known as online travel agents (OTAs)). We highlight the role of OTAs in the current travel landscape, and we discuss the popular contracting forms between OTAs and hotels, which are the so-called merchant and retail (commission) models. We illustrate how these contracts fail to coordinate the hotel–OTA relationship, and then, we develop a new type of contract that can efficiently coordinate a supply chain consisting of the OTA and the individual hotels. We provide theoretical results and numerical examples for a one-to-one model with one OTA and one supplier and a more realistic setting with an OTA selling to consumers on behalf of numerous hotel partners.

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“…Consumer surplus refers to the difference between the final price and a consumer's reservation price for a certain quantity of products [63,64]. In this paper, the consumer surplus, which is defined as CS, is given by:…”

Section: Interaction Analysis Regarding Production Capacity Sharing Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Selection and Pricing Decisions Considering Three Charging Modes of Production Capacity Sharing Platform: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

et al. 2019

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In the context of sharing economy, a manufacturer can source from two alternative channels: sharing and traditional, when facing production capacity constraints and sustainably conscious consumers. The aim of the paper is to analyze channel selection and pricing strategies of the manufacturer for achieving sustainable operations, to investigate the operations of the platform regarding charging modes, access requirements, and commission rates in different stages of development, and to discuss the interaction among all stakeholders for sustainability in the whole system. The game-theoretic approach is adopted. The results provide references for decisions of the manufacturer and surplus production capacity supplier to join in the sharing, as well as corresponding optimal pricing strategies, which guides platforms to keep a balance between profitability and attracting participants by relatively low access requirements and commission rates. Moreover, developing platforms prefer to charge suppliers and set low access requirements while relatively developed platforms tend to charge bilateral sides or manufacturers and set high access requirements. Charging the manufacturer encourages the bilateral participation of the platform most. In addition, as charging mode changes, the trend of changes in consumer surplus and social welfare is the same as that in the market share of products from the sharing channel.More specifically, from the perspective of actual operations, production capacity sharing brings new directions to sustainable supply chain management issues. For example, as consumers have become more sustainably concerned [16,17], production capacity sharing on the platforms is an effective alternative for manufacturing enterprises to ensure competitive advantage by meeting demands of the market, reduce their risk of wasting capacity, no longer face with the selection limitations, optimize business scheduling, and gain new revenue streams [13]. However, production capacity sharing mechanism design considering sharing features is challenging. For example, a capacity-constrained manufacturer or an overcapacity supplier needs to decide whether to join in the sharing considering the cost of the sharing and consumer's consciousness of sustainability comprehensively. In addition, a platform operator needs to design appropriate operational mechanisms particularly the charging mechanisms to balance the relationship between attracting participants of the platform and gaining profits, considering its own development levels and operational goals. Therefore, with regards to production capacity sharing, how to make channel selection decisions and corresponding optimal pricing strategies for manufacturing enterprises and how to design operational mechanisms for platforms from a sustainable operations perspective is important, urgent, and promising. In other words, the aims of this paper are to explore the behaviors of the overcapacity manufacturer and capacity supplier in traditional and sharing manufacturing environments and the ...

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Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers

Cited by 28 publications

References 39 publications

Introducing a novel revenue-sharing contract in media supply chain management using data mining and multi-criteria decision-making methods

Introducing a novel revenue-sharing contract in media supply chain management using data mining and multi-criteria decision-making methods

Coordination Contracts for Hotels and Online Travel Agents

Channel Selection and Pricing Decisions Considering Three Charging Modes of Production Capacity Sharing Platform: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

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