Strategic inventory: Manufacturer vs. retailer investment

Moon, Ilkyeong; Dey, Kartick; Saha, Subrata

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2017.10.005

Cited by 50 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Mantin and Jiang [5] posit that the quality of inventories is subject to deterioration from one period to the next, thus they explore the implications of strategic inventories when they are sold as inferior substitutes in the second period. Moon et al [2] present a two-period SC model under demand induced by selling price and investment effort in the presence of This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, with the support of modern logistics and information technology, many firms needn't hold much inventory for a specific selling season. Combining the above two contradictions, many researchers find that inventory may not always be beneficial in multi-period transaction, and most firms are willing to hold inventory if and only if more additional values are added [1][2][3]. In this paper, we focus on the intertemporal inventory which is held by the SC from one selling season to the next.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, it is particularly important for the suppliers to determine appropriate wholesale prices when the retailers have intertemporal inventory capability. In practice, the dynamic wholesale-price (DW) contract and the commitment wholesale-price (CW) contract are two common wholesale-price contracts adopted by SC members, which also have attracted much attention in the extant literature [1][2][3][4][5]. Under the DW contract, the suppliers sequentially announce the wholesale prices at the beginning of each selling season.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Contract Preferences Under Two Uncertain Selling Seasons Considering Intertemporal Inventory Capability

et al. 2021

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We propose an intertemporal inventory decision model under demand uncertainty and retail competition. Facing the fact that different firms may have different intertemporal inventory capabilities, the paper introduces two retailers and assumes only one retailer has the ability to carry intertemporal inventories. Two different contracts, i.e., the dynamic wholesale-price contract and the commitment wholesale-price contract are proposed. The optimal decisions are derived under each contract, and all members' preferences regarding the two contracts are investigated. The results show that there exist some situations in which the supply chain members prefer the same contract, and they can reach an agreement on the contract selection. We also find that the intertemporal inventory discriminately affects the supply chain members' expected profits under two different contracts. The retailer's intertemporal inventory capability may be beneficial for all members under the dynamic wholesale-price contract, but it always damages the supplier's expected profit under the commitment wholesale-price contract. INDEX TERMS Intertemporal inventory, retail competition, dynamic contract, commitment contractThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Contract Preferences Under Two Uncertain Selling Seasons Considering Intertemporal Inventory Capability

et al. 2021

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“…Content may change prior to final publication. perspectives, such as strategic inventory [14], fresh-product supply chain [15][16][17], government subsidies [18] [19], recycling channel selection [8,20], consumer preferences [21], etc. In response to the research questions in this paper, the decision-making and coordination of green closed-loop supply chain, and coordination of supply chain with fairness concern are reviewed.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

Zhang

2020

IEEE Access

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Due to serious environmental pollution and waste of resources, the government advocates the development of a sustainable circular economy, and academia and manufacturing are gradually paying attention to the green closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a green closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered. The manufacturer would cost a great deal to recycle waste products for remanufacturing while developing and producing green products, which may concern about the fairness of the profit distribution. Based on game theory, four different game scenarios are proposed, which are a centralized model and three decentralized models including manufacturer considering fairness neutrality, the retailer considering manufacturer's fairness concerns and the retailer ignoring manufacturer's fairness concerns. This paper compares and analyzes the optimal decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer in different scenarios, discusses the impact of manufacturer's fairness concerns on various decision variables, the profits of supply chain members and the overall profits, and then studies the effect of green efficiency on green closed-loop supply. The results show that this behavior would cause less damage to the green closed-loop supply chain and is more conducive to ensuring the environmental quality of green products, recycling and reuse of waste products and consumer rights when the retailer considers the manufacturer's fairness concerns behavior. By designing a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, it can effectively achieve the Pareto improvement of the green closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns.

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“…Mantin and Jiang [6] explored the impact of the product quality deterioration in the presence of SI. Moon et al [7] analyzed the impact of SI in perspective of supply chain coordination. They found that the optimal supply chain profit cannot be achieved by implementing quadratic quantity discount contract mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procurement Decisions in Multi-period Supply Chain

Nielsen

Saha

2018

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

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Pricing and ordering decision in multi-period supply chain environments is not explored comprehensively. We consider three pragmatic procurement scenarios where the retailer can procure products (i) by maintaining strategic inventory, (ii) in bulk in first-period and distribute them in forthcoming selling period, and (iii) without maintaining any inventory. The results suggest that conventional single period planning exhibit sub-optimal characteristics. Build-up strategic inventory is not always profitable for the retailer. The retailer can also earn more profits by employing a bulk procurement strategy.

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Strategic inventory: Manufacturer vs. retailer investment

Cited by 50 publications

References 31 publications

Supply Chain Contract Preferences Under Two Uncertain Selling Seasons Considering Intertemporal Inventory Capability

Supply Chain Contract Preferences Under Two Uncertain Selling Seasons Considering Intertemporal Inventory Capability

Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

Procurement Decisions in Multi-period Supply Chain

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