Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions

Woodward, Kyle

doi:10.1145/2940716.2940788

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…McAdams (2008) extends this result to a setting in which equilibrium bids are not assumed to be strictly decreasing but may be subject to "strategic ironing" as inWoodward (2014).…”

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confidence: 77%

Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Hortaçsu

McAdams

2018

Journal of Economic Literature

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Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (i) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored-search ads), (ii) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (iii) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.

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“…McAdams (2008) extends this result to a setting in which equilibrium bids are not assumed to be strictly decreasing but may be subject to "strategic ironing" as inWoodward (2014).…”

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confidence: 77%

Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Hortaçsu

McAdams

2018

Journal of Economic Literature

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“…In uniform price auctions, each bidder strategically reduces her bids for later units to reduce the expected price paid for earlier units (Ausubel et al, ). In discriminatory auctions, bidders would often benefit from bidding less for their earlier units than they do for their later units, but they cannot because submitted demand must be weakly downward sloping (Woodward, ). In either case, these strategic effects introduce dependencies between each bidder's unit‐wise bids that can be complex to disentangle.…”

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confidence: 99%

Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps

Baisa

Burkett

2020

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We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this setting and use these results to give a tractable characterization of equilibrium behavior. We use this characterization to study the policy of capping the amount that may be won by large bidders in the auction, a policy that has received little attention in the auction literature. Our analysis shows that the trade-offs involved when adjusting these quantity caps can be understood in terms familiar to students of asymmetric first-price single-unit auctions. Furthermore, whether one seeks to maximize welfare or revenue can have contradictory implications for the choice of cap.We thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.1 This policy currently restricts bidders to winning at most 35% of the market supply, but it has evolved over the course of the 20th century, with its size varying between 25% and 35% (Garbade and Ingber, 2005). Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) find in their survey of "treasury" auctions around the world that 23% of the countries in their sample impose a ceiling on auction awards.

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Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder

Baisa

Burkett

2016

SSRN Journal

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Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions

Cited by 3 publications

References 25 publications

Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps

Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder

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