Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence

Schanzenbach, Max M.; Tiller, Emerson H.

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm002

Cited by 104 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Although alternative accounts might explain the results (district court judges might focus more on facts, which may be less amenable to political influence than judgments of law), other studies support the conclusion that avoiding reversal matters to judges. Schanzenbach & Tiller (2006) demonstrated that judges engage in strategic behavior among federal district court judges to avoid reversal in sentencing decisions.…”

Section: Reversal Aversionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

Rachlinski¹,

Wistrich²

2017

Preprint

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 AbstractDo judges make decisions that are truly impartial? A wide range of experimental and field studies reveal that several extra-legal factors influence judicial decision making. Demographic characteristics of judges and litigants affect judges' decisions. Judges also rely heavily on intuitive reasoning in deciding cases, making them vulnerable to the use of mental shortcuts that can lead to mistakes. Furthermore, judges sometimes rely on facts outside the record and rule more favorably towards litigants who are more sympathetic or with whom they share demographic characteristics. On the whole, judges are excellent decision makers, and sometimes resist common errors of judgment that influence ordinary adults. The weight of the evidence, however, suggests that judges are vulnerable to systematic deviations from the ideal of judicial impartiality.

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Section: Reversal Aversionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

Rachlinski¹,

Wistrich²

2017

Preprint

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“…For this reason, many commentators doubt that the Supreme Court can maintain control over the circuit courts through the threat of reversal (see, for example, Posner 2008;Kim 2007). Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) study the interplay between circuit and district courts under the sentencing guidelines. They find that Democratic district judges calculated lower offense levels than Republicans and that Democratic district judges also granted larger departures when supervised by circuit courts dominated by Democrats.…”

Section: Positive Political Theory Of Standards Of Review In Sentencingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 The 1. A subtle but important distinction is that we examine the threshold decision whether to depart, whereas Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) examine the magnitude of departures. The magnitude of a departure has always been reviewed for reasonableness, whereas whether a departure was warranted in the first place has been subject to changing standards of review.…”

Section: Positive Political Theory Of Standards Of Review In Sentencingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing

Fischman¹,

Schanzenbach²

2011

The Journal of Legal Studies

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“…59 Similarly, our approach may shed light on the conditions under which having single versus numerous large block shareholders in the ownership structure of a company can facilitate e¢ cient endogenous information production -a question that has been increasingly important recently. 60 …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels

Spitzer¹,

Talley

2011

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

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In the last …fteen years, numerous studies of multi-member courts have documented a phenomenon popularly known as "panel e¤ects."Two provocative …ndings from this literature are: (1) the inclusion of (nonpivotal) members from outside the dominant ideology on the panel predicts higher reversal rates of administrative agencies that are "like minded" with the panel's median voter; and (2) when mixed panels do not reverse, they frequently issue unanimous decisions. The apparently moderating effects of mixed panels both pose a challenge to conventional median voter theories and call into question the predictability and legitimacy of judicial review. Accordingly, many scholars have o¤ered their own explanation for panel e¤ects (including collegiality, dissent aversion, deliberation e¤ects, whistle-blowing, and others). In this paper, we propose a general model that (among other things) predicts panel e¤ects as a byproduct of strategic information acquisition. The kernel of our argument is that ideologically extreme, non-pivotal members of deliberative panels have incentives to engage in costly information production in cases where pivotal members would rationally choose not to do so. As a result, diverse panel compositions can catalyze distinct forms of information production producing equilibrium panel e¤ects. Our informational account -if correct -has normative implications for the composition of judicial panels in particular and for deliberative groups more generally.

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Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence

Cited by 104 publications

References 27 publications

Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing

Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels

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