Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources

Rubio, Santiago J.; Escriche, Luisa

doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00073-6

Cited by 77 publications

(84 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Thus, the above finding of Rubio and Escriche (2001) can be regarded as a dynamic extension of this static result: under stagewise leadership of the exporting country, the importing country's optimal tariff rate at time t is not 14 Levhari and Mirman (1980) solved for both the Nash equilibrium and the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium of a fish-war model in discrete time. Basar et al (1985) solved for the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium of a model of capitalist-worker conflict in discrete time and argued that the method can extended to the continuous time setting.…”

Section: Comparing With Stagewise Stackelberg Leadershipmentioning

confidence: 94%

Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly

Fujiwara

Long

2011

Dyn Games Appl

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Section: Comparing With Stagewise Stackelberg Leadershipmentioning

confidence: 94%

Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly

Fujiwara

Long

2011

Dyn Games Appl

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“…See Wirl (1994Wirl ( , 1995, Wirl and Dockner (1995), Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and Escriche (2001). In this framework, they have studied the strategic taxation of CO 2 emissions by the governments of the importing countries and thus have clarified which are the determinants of the carbon tax dynamics when the strategic behavior of the agents is taken into account.…”

Section: Strategic Pigouvian Taxation With Stock Externalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 From the numerous economic applications of differential games we would like to mention the ones developed by Başar, Haurie and Ricci (1985), van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1990), Gradus (1991) and Rubio and Escriche (2001). In these papers, devoted to different issues, is explicitly recognized that the feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

Rubio

2002

SSRN Journal

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In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium independently of the player being the leader of the game. Secondly, sufficient conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the two equilibria are defined. A review of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting in which differential games are defined. In this setting the first movement advantage of the leader may disappears and then both equilibria coincide.

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“…Bergstrom (1982) showed that, facing an inelastic world resource supply, importing countries may tax domestic use to extract rents that would otherwise accrue to exporters. The rent-extraction mechanism is reinforced by the introduction of pollution damages (Amundsen and Schöb, 1999) and monopolistic behavior on the supply side (Brander and Djajic, 1983) since the importers'incentive to tax is stronger the higher the rents to be potentially captured and the lower the social bene…t from domestic resource consumption (Rubio and Escriche, 2001;Liski and Tahvonen, 2004). The existing literature on this topic neglects however two important aspects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Productivity Gaps and Tax Policies Under Asymmetric Trade

Bretschger

Valente

2016

Macroecon. Dynam.

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Abstract. We build a two-country model of endogenous growth to study the welfare e¤ects of taxes on tradable primary inputs when countries engage in asymmetric trade.We obtain explicit links between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the incentives of resource exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use. The exporters'incentive to subsidize hinges on slower productivity growth and is disconnected from the importers' incentive to tax resource in ‡ows -i.e., rent extraction. Moreover, faster productivity growth exacerbates the importers'incentive to tax, beyond the rentextraction motive. In a strategic tax game, the only equilibrium is of Stackelberg type and features, for a wide range of parameter values, positive exporters'subsidies and positive importers'taxes at the same time.

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Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources

Cited by 77 publications

References 13 publications

Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly

Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

Productivity Gaps and Tax Policies Under Asymmetric Trade

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