Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

Hattori, Keisuke

doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9349-6

Cited by 18 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…It is also worth mentioning that strategic delegation is labeled as "strategic voting" whenever the principal is the electorate or, more precisely, the median voter and the elected government is the agent (Persson and Tabellini 1992). Siqueira (2003), Buchholz et al (2005), Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010) analyse strategic voting in the context of environmental policy. While the first three contributions exclusively focus on environmental taxation, Hattori (2010) also examines the outcome of strategic voting under emissions caps.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Habla

Winkler

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents caring less for environmental damages than they do themselves in case of an international market regime, while they opt for self-representation in case of domestic markets. This strategic delegation incentive renders the linking of permit markets less attractive and constitutes a novel explanation for the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international permit markets.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Habla

Winkler

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…Siqueira 2003, Buchholz et al (2005), Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010) analyze strategic voting in the context of environmental policy. While the first three contributions exclusively focus on environmental taxation, Hattori (2010) also examines the outcome of strategic voting under emissions caps.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this result breaks down in the case of perfect pollution spillovers, such as the emission and diffusion of greenhouse gases. Hattori (2010) function is more (less) convex than the unit elastic demand function. Hence, the desirability of international cooperation depends mostly on the type of public good considered.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Negotiating International Carbon Markets

Arvaniti

Habla

2020

SSRN Journal

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International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO 2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We identify the circumstances under which governments benefit or are harmed by cooperation in the form of an international market. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom that an international market is most beneficial for participating countries when they have vastly diverging marginal abatement costs; rather, it may be more promising to negotiate agreements with non-tradable emissions caps.

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“…6 For simplicity, we assume that marginal production costs equal zero. 7 This type of transboundary pollution is employed by Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010). The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] can be considered as altruistic preference of policymakers for environmental damages that happen in other countries.…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 In the case of strategic substitutes, a leader chooses lower tax rates than a follower. This is because the leader knows that if he lowers its taxes, the follower will raise its taxes.…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

Hattori

Kitamura

2012

Environ Resource Econ

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In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages: When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes and the simultaneousmove policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements and the sequential-move policymaking emerges. In addition, we extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk dominant equilibrium is also that the less vulnerable country leads.

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Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

Cited by 18 publications

References 40 publications

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

The Political Economy of Negotiating International Carbon Markets

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

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