Strategies of pro-European parties in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge

Abstract

IntroductionDuring the last decade, almost all countries within the EU have experienced the emergence of Eurosceptic parties. These parties have won 113 out of 751 seats in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Their unprecedented success was fuelled by the ongoing crisis of the EU regarding bailout, the threat of a Eurozone breakdown, growing state debts, the instability of the banking system and disputed austerity measures. Thus, Eurosceptic parties have become a challenge for those parties that have integrated Europe for decades.This article seeks to describe how pro-European parties strategically communicate when facing this Eurosceptic challenge and how this affects the politicization of EU integration in each of the examined countries. Our description of pro-European parties' strategic behaviour grants special attention to pro-European catch-all parties, especially to those struggling with internal dissent regarding EU integration, as it is these large, vote-winning parties that strongly shape societal debates.Our study contributes to research in a three-fold manner. First, we focus on the strategic interactions of parties (for this research desiderate, e.g. Kriesi, 2008) by analysing how pro-EU parties communicate when facing a Eurosceptic challenge. In this analysis we depart from research focusing predominantly on Eurosceptics. Instead, Eurosceptic parties in our study serve as a comparative baseline to identify the strategies of pro-EU parties. Second, drawing on Meguid (2005) and Bale et al. (2010), we further elaborate on the strategic repertoire that parties have at hand. Third, we link strategic party behaviour to EU politicization in a country.We thereby show that parties' communication strategies regarding topics, issues and positions source: https://doi.org/10.7892/boris.98770 | downloaded: 2.8.2020 directly affect the core components of politicization. Politicization within a country occurs if (a) salience is attached to the topic of EU integration; (b) parties enter a common debate about the same aspects of EU integration and (c) polarized opinions are voiced.Our focus on party elites' strategic behaviour and the resulting elite politicization towards EU integration seems justified as research has shown that it is elites who (partially) shape public opinions about EU integration (Gabel and Scheve, 2007), who impact the extent to which voters rely on EU considerations in European Parliament elections (Hobolt and Spoon, 2012) and who strongly influence mass media coverage about the integration project (Adam, 2007).To answer our research question on the communication of pro-European parties when facing a Eurosceptic challenge, we first describe the strategic repertoire that pro-European parties have at hand and develop hypotheses on how this repertoire is used by pro-European parties in general and by pro-European catch-all parties facing strong internal dissent. Second, we illustrate how party strategies can be analysed by means of quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-u...

Undermining, defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicisation

“…Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that pro‐European parties often hold on to their position when facing Eurosceptic challenger parties (at least when their supporters are united; Adam et al. ), that European elites emphasise public interests more strongly in the face of politicisation (De Bruycker ), that they adopt a more pro‐European perspective against salient Euroscepticism at home (Bes ) or that they even alter the contents of supranational policies in response (Rauh ; Van der Veer & Haverland ).…”

“…In other words, we consider partisan Euroscepticism to be an amplifier for the position‐taking and position‐blurring effects emerging from Euroscepticism in domestic public opinion (see also Adam et al. ; Rovny ). Consistent with their basic incentive structures, this should affect national leaders and European Commissioners alike: H4a :The negative effect of public Euroscepticism on the sentiment national leaders attach to their public messages on European integration is moderated by the strength of Eurosceptic parties. H4b :The positive effect of public Euroscepticism on the complexity national leaders attach to their public messages on European integration is moderated by the strength of Eurosceptic parties. H4c :The positive effect of public Euroscepticism on the sentiment EU Commissioners attach to their public messages on European integration is moderated by the strength of Eurosceptic parties. H4d :The negative effect of public Euroscepticism on the complexity EU Commissioners attach to their public messages on European integration is moderated by the strength of Eurosceptic parties. …”

Responding to the crisis: Eurosceptic parties of the left and right and their changing position towards the European Union

“…This difference is not at all surprising considering that mainstream parties use two main strategies in the context of the increasing contestation over the EU: either to decrease the salience of this issue (De Vries & Hobolt ) particularly in the case of intra‐party dissent over Europe (Spoon & Williams, ) or to blur their stances (Rovny ; Adam et al. ). Responsiveness, in turn, is expected to be the strategy of Eurosceptic parties.…”

“…Compared to mainstream parties which largely retain their basic Euro-positive position (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2016) and are less 'connected' with the stances of their supporters in these matters (Steenbergen et al 2007), Eurosceptic parties are responsive vis-à-vis to a general anti-European shift in public opinion. This difference is not at all surprising considering that mainstream parties use two main strategies in the context of the increasing contestation over the EU: either to decrease the salience of this issue (De Vries & Hobolt 2012) particularly in the case of intraparty dissent over Europe (Spoon & Williams, 2017) or to blur their stances (Rovny 2012;Adam et al 2017). Responsiveness, in turn, is expected to be the strategy of Eurosceptic parties.…”

Mobilizing Citizens for Costly Policies: The Conditional Effect of Party Cues on Support for International Bailouts in the European Union

“…Facing an increasingly eurosceptical public and the rise of anti‐EU challenger parties such as AfD, pro‐European mainstream parties across Europe have been sending weak signals on European integration in general and bailouts in particular (Adam et al , ; Rovny, ). Analyzing party press releases for the 2014 EP elections, Adam et al (, p. 261) conclude that ‘pro‐European catch‐all parties with strong internal dissent […] silence Europe and choose blurring or adoption strategies’. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's hesitation about funding the financial bailout for Greece in 2010 is a case in point.…”