Strategies of Rupture

Christodoulidis, Emilios

doi:10.1007/s10978-008-9042-x

Cited by 48 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…104 The lawyer framed his legal intervention in political-strategic terms, denouncing French colonialism in Algeria, which had caused the Algerian war of independence in the first place. 105 In doing so, Vergès did not aim at exculpating the defendant. This was clear when Bouhired stated during the trial that 'You know nothing about me.…”

Section: Defence To Punishment As a Procès De Rupturementioning

confidence: 99%

Between show-trials and Utopia: A study of the tu quoque defence

Borrelli¹

2019

Leiden Journal of International Law

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Tu quoque, meaning in Latin ‘you too’, is a fallacy of relevance which targets the hypocrisy of the arguer rather than the truth of the advanced argument.In international criminal tribunals, defendants who advance the defence choose not to argue for their innocence, but rather seek to shift the spotlight on the crimes committed by the prosecuting authority or by the opposing side to the conflict, so as to delegitimize the entire prosecution as a form of ‘victor’s justice’. According to legal doxa, the argument has never been accepted in court. As a consequence, it has also been completely neglected within academia. Yet, the tu quoque defence is extremely powerful, as not only proven by its recurrent use over time, but also by its ability to turn trials into ‘show-trials’. This delegitimization of international prosecutions not only does impact the memory and reconciliation of war-torn communities, but also weakens the edifice of international criminal law.‘The Tu Quoque Argument as a Defence to International Crimes, Prosecution or Punishment,’ written by Sienho Yee in 2004 is the only existing in-depth treatment of the defence. Departing from a critique of Yee’s theorization, this article attempts to fill the scholarly lacuna that exists around tu quoque. It departs from a critique of Yee’s theorization and questions whether the defence can be legally legitimate. The article concludes that the defence is legally void, but international criminal tribunals and academia must not disregard its underlying argument because of its political pertinence.

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Section: Defence To Punishment As a Procès De Rupturementioning

confidence: 99%

Between show-trials and Utopia: A study of the tu quoque defence

Borrelli¹

2019

Leiden Journal of International Law

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“…But if certain strands of universalism fail to attend to how rights struggles may involve community-based claims that exclude the oppressors from their scope for the purposes of countering historically rooted forms of oppression (e.g. Hoover, 2016: 47, 54), Hoover’s account risks underemphasizing that such struggles also involve universalizing, generalizing, and abstracting moves, as can be seen in ONE DC’s demand for “universal housing.” 1 Perugini and Gordon are right to highlight that human rights cannot, and should not, be reduced to their legal codifications, but their insistence on “a nonlegal perspective” (2015: 136) risks disregarding legal efforts that could involve “strategies of rupture,” to use a term proposed by Emilios Christodoulidis (2009) and discussed by Golder (2015: 124–125). Such strategies could mobilize an immanent critique of law for the purposes of making it more responsive to forms of violence that would otherwise be invisible or unintelligible within its “economy of representation” (Christodoulidis, 2009: 5).…”

Section: Human Rights and The Heterogeneous Practices Of Emancipationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hoover, 2016: 47, 54), Hoover’s account risks underemphasizing that such struggles also involve universalizing, generalizing, and abstracting moves, as can be seen in ONE DC’s demand for “universal housing.” 1 Perugini and Gordon are right to highlight that human rights cannot, and should not, be reduced to their legal codifications, but their insistence on “a nonlegal perspective” (2015: 136) risks disregarding legal efforts that could involve “strategies of rupture,” to use a term proposed by Emilios Christodoulidis (2009) and discussed by Golder (2015: 124–125). Such strategies could mobilize an immanent critique of law for the purposes of making it more responsive to forms of violence that would otherwise be invisible or unintelligible within its “economy of representation” (Christodoulidis, 2009: 5). Finally, in discussing Foucault’s refusal to use the language of rights to oppose the death penalty, Golder argues that a “tactical” invocation of rights in that context would have called for prison reforms but fallen short of the “strategic” goal of prison abolition.…”

Section: Human Rights and The Heterogeneous Practices Of Emancipationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the ambivalent politics of human rights

Gündoğdu

2018

Journal of International Political Theory

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“…Such a simple act of defiance (providing financial support and lending political support) is made powerful here not only because it provides those listed with a chance to represent their story. It is also a representational act that makes visible the severe coercive effects of this list whilst at the same time openly confronting its disruptive rationale by “associating with” the enlistedand effecting a “strategy of rupture” (Christodoulidis, 2009).…”

Section: Matters Of Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of security lists

Goede

Sullivan

2015

Environ Plan D

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The authors contributed equally to the paperThe List, one of the most archaic means of written enumeration and classification, has made a forceful recurrence in the post-9/11 global security landscape. From terrorist sanctions lists and No-Fly lists to “kill-lists” for drone warfare; from the privately compiled lists of risky banking clients to the regulatory lists of untrustworthy or incompliant companies, the list seems to proliferate as a contemporary technology of security and regulation. How and why are lists becoming newly embedded in security practices? What work do lists perform as specific techniques of government and forms of normative ordering? And what consequences follow for how problems of legal accountability and political responsibility are currently understood and addressed? This paper frames security lists as inscription devices that are heterogeneous, unpredictable and productive in unforeseen ways. It draws attention to the ways they materialise the categories they purport to describe, and how they enact novel forms of knowledge, jurisdiction and targeting. We suggest that critiques could be strengthened by making visible and contesting the fragmented and diffuse conditions through which security lists are produced.

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Strategies of Rupture

Cited by 48 publications

References 9 publications

Between show-trials and Utopia: A study of the tu quoque defence

Between show-trials and Utopia: A study of the tu quoque defence

On the ambivalent politics of human rights

The politics of security lists

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