Strategy and Supply (RLE The First World War)

An examination of the origins of Gallipoli, or rather, the Dardanelles operation, is long overdue. Most Anglophone histories have focused on the fighting and dying on the beachheads, notably the Anzac experience, the failure of the campaign and its consequences. Although the planning of the operation has received some attention, its origin and motivations have seldom been analysed. This study by naval historian Nicholas Lambert is therefore welcome.Lambert's book of 2012, Planning Armageddon, caused quite a splash in the calm waters of the history of British strategy. Many reviewers were fulsome in their praise. Some, however, raised serious doubts about the consistency of Lambert's central thesis and his methodology. Above all, his argument that Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and the Admiralty believed that economic warfare would be a 'fast-acting' strategy to defeat Germanya 'British Schlieffen Plan'has come in for sustained criticism, not only for its lack of cogency, but also its lack of historical evidence. 1 If such a plan for a lightning strike existed, no one in authority, such as the Prime Minister or the First Sea Lord, knew of it. Moreover, several arguments were flawed by internal contradictions, for example, in relation to policy towards neutral states, and misinterpretations based on misreading of sources. Portions of documents are quoted when they support his thesis; other portions of the same document that contradict it are omitted. 2 The assertion that the * I wish to thank John Horne, Elisabeth Piller and Jonas Scherner for their valuable advice on an earlier draft. The final version of this article was written before Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. 1 John W. Coogan, 'The Short War Illusion Resurrected. The Myth of Economic Warfare as the British Schlieffen Plan',

Section: The Historiographical Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Historiographical Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Book reviews

Kramer

2022

“…Ex-Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, still influential in policy-making, and Churchill, who had at first resisted the Russian pressure, conceded that these potential acquisitions were a factor in preventing Russia from abandoning the war. 100 The foreign policy of Russia from March 1915 to May 1917, according to Robert Kerner, an early scholar of the Agreement, was 'dominated by one main idea, the maintenance of the Agreement against any modification whatsoever'. 101 While Sazonov had initially 'panicked' at the idea of Britain capturing Constantinople and keeping Russia out, 102 once the Agreement was concluded, the Gallipoli campaign became a measure of the bona fides of the Western parties to the Agreement.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…106 After the evacuation decision, Lloyd George offered Russia substantial assistance in small arms, hoping this 'largesse' might 'ease Russian disappointment'. 107 It is likely then that British reluctance to test Russian sensitivity regarding an evacuation of Gallipoli had contributed to its longevity. Some arguments have been raised against the interpretation of the Constantinople Agreement proposed here.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Bear in the Room: Gallipoli, Russia, and the First World War

Trudinger

2020

Russia was much more entwined in the narrative of Gallipoli than the Australian (and the international) historiography of that epic encounter suggests. The principal knot that tied Gallipoli and Russia together was the Constantinople Agreement of April 1915. Russia utilized British fears that she would abandon the Eastern front to impose on its Allies the secret Constantinople Agreement, which promised possession of the Straits and Constantinople to Russia after a successful war. Gallipoli was, in effect, both the main catalyst and guarantor of the Agreement, which then played a role in keeping Russia in the war, crucially denying Germany a one-front war.

“…132 Wells Hood for example wrote that 'The Russians are splendid fellows and fight like Hell, live on practically nothing, and never complain… although they go into the trenches and never come out again for thirty days, they sing both when going in and coming out'. 133 Pinkerton had 'generally pictured the fight in the Caucasus: they were 'splendid horsemen and awful looking toughs', and made 'short work' of their Kurdish opponents.…”

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confidence: 99%

Encounters on the eastern front: The Royal Naval Armoured Car Division in Russia 1915–1920

Alston

2017

The Royal Naval Armoured Car Division was dispatched to fight with the Russian Army in 1915. In diaries, letters, and post-war exercises in autobiography, members of the unit expressed a sense of disconnection from the ‘real war’ in the west. In fact, their tour of Russia exemplified many aspects of the wartime Anglo-Russian alliance: the profusion of channels of authority; the logistics of wartime supply; the interventionist schemes designed to keep Russia in the war at all costs. This article examines how the connections between the western and eastern fronts were understood and navigated by diplomats and strategists, and by soldiers encountering an unfamiliar theatre of war.