Strategy News Is Good News: How Journalistic Coverage of Politics Reduces Affective Polarization

Zoizner, Alon; Shenhav, Shaul R.; Fogel-Dror, Yair; Sheafer, Tamir

doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1829762

Cited by 15 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…There is great concern about rising affective polarization because its presumed negative consequences may be uniquely harmful or destabilizing for democratic societies -for example by stimulating support for undemocratic candidates and practices, or by fomenting political violence (e.g., 2, 8-13). In light of the presumed dire consequences of affective polarization, academics and practitioners have invested a great deal of energy in developing interventions that reduce affective polarization, typically using outcomes based on sentiment towards opposing partisans (e.g., 12,[14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]. This body of work has uncovered numerous effective approaches for reducing affective polarization, tools that offer hope for maintainingor restoringdemocratic norms and practices.…”

Section: Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Improve Anti-democratic Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Necessarily Improve Anti-Democratic Attitudes

Voelkel¹,

Chu²,

Stagnaro³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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There is widespread concern that rising affective polarization – dislike for members of the opposing party – is exacerbating a range of anti-democratic attitudes, such as support for undemocratic practices, undemocratic candidates, and partisan violence. Accordingly, scholars and practitioners alike have invested great effort in developing depolarization interventions, and several promising interventions have been identified that successfully reduce affective polarization. Critically, however, it remains unclear whether these interventions reduce consequential anti-democratic attitudes, versus merely changing sentiments toward outpartisans. In this paper, we address this question with high-power experimental tests of two previously established depolarization interventions, one a correction of misperceptions of the views of outpartisans, the other an invitation to think about interpartisan friendships (total n = 4,512). We find that the depolarization interventions reliably reduce affective polarization, but this reduction does not reliably translate into reduced support for undemocratic practices, undemocratic candidates, or partisan violence. Thus, efforts to strengthen pro-democratic attitudes should target these outcomes directly, rather than following the current practice of focusing on affective polarization as a proxy. More broadly, these findings call into question the previously assumed causal link of affective polarization on anti-democratic attitudes.

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Section: Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Improve Anti-democratic Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Necessarily Improve Anti-Democratic Attitudes

Voelkel¹,

Chu²,

Stagnaro³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Partisan animosity in America [1][2][3][4] undermines our ability to address diverse policy issues such as pandemics [5,6], income inequality [7], and education [8], and may also reduce support for democracy [9] and the peaceful transfer of power [10]. Whereas there are several reviews of the causes and consequences of partisan animosity [1,[11][12][13], there are no reviews of the many interventions [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30] to reduce it. With millions of dollars invested to reduce partisan animosity across hundreds of organizations and research programs, there is a pressing need for scientific evaluation and synthesis of these interventions.…”

Section: Interventions To Reduce Partisan Animositymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other scientists have reduced the salience of partisan identity without directly invoking a common ingroup. For example, partisans who engage with political campaign strategy news feel more positively toward the other side [30]. Political strategy news hides the differences between the parties as both parties engage in similar political strategy.…”

Section: Highlighting Commonalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interventions to reduce partisan animosity

et al. 2022

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Rising partisan animosity is linked to less support for democracy and more support for political violence. Here we provide a multi-level review of interventions designed to improve partisan animosity, which we define as negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors towards a political outgroup. We introduce the TRI framework for the three levels of interventions-Thoughts (correcting misconceptions, highlighting commonalities), Relationships (building dialogue skills, fostering positive contact), and Institutions (changing public discourse, transforming political structures)-and connect these levels by highlighting the importance of motivation and mobilization. Our review encompasses both interventions conducted as part of academic research projects, as well as real-world interventions led by practitioners in nonprofit organizations. We also explore the challenges of durability and scalability, examine self-fulfilling polarization and interventions that backfire, and discuss future directions for reducing partisan animosity.

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Section: Interventions To Reduce Partisan Animositymentioning

confidence: 99%

Interventions to Reduce Partisan Animosity

Hartman¹,

Blakey²,

Womick³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Rising partisan animosity is linked to less support for democracy and more support for political violence. Here we provide a multi-level review of interventions designed to improve partisan animosity, which we define as negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors towards a political outgroup. We introduce the TRI framework for the three levels of interventions—Thoughts (correcting misconceptions, highlighting commonalities), Relationships (building dialogue skills, fostering positive contact), and Institutions (changing public discourse, transforming political structures)—and connect these levels by highlighting the importance of motivation and mobilization. Our review encompasses both interventions conducted as part of academic research projects, as well as real-world interventions led by practitioners in nonprofit organizations. We also explore the challenges of durability and scalability, examine self-fulfilling polarization and interventions that backfire, and discuss future directions for reducing partisan animosity.

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Strategy News Is Good News: How Journalistic Coverage of Politics Reduces Affective Polarization

Cited by 15 publications

References 58 publications

Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Necessarily Improve Anti-Democratic Attitudes

Interventions Reducing Affective Polarization Do Not Necessarily Improve Anti-Democratic Attitudes

Interventions to reduce partisan animosity

Interventions to Reduce Partisan Animosity

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