1984
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-842x.1984.tb01224.x
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Strategy, Nontransitive Dominance and the Exponential Distribution

Abstract: Summary An easily programmed recursive formula for the evaluation of the distribution function of ratios of linear combinations of independent exponential random variables is developed. This formula is shown to yield the probability that one team beats another in a contest we call the special gladiator game. This game generates tournaments which exhibit nontransitive dominance and have some surprising consequences. Similar results are obtained for a recursive formula based on the geometric distribution.

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Cited by 15 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Notes 1. Kaminsky, Luks & Nelson (1984) investigate a special gladiator game. Suppose that two teams are to do battle in an arena.…”
Section: Efron Dicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Notes 1. Kaminsky, Luks & Nelson (1984) investigate a special gladiator game. Suppose that two teams are to do battle in an arena.…”
Section: Efron Dicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Participants have to shoot as accurately as possible in 3 Colonel Blotto Game has been experimentally analyzed by Chowdhury et al (2013). 4 Note that a dynamic sequential version of Colonnel Blotto, called Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game (Kaminsky et al (1984), Rinott et al (2012)), is also different since the players decide the order of the gladiators and if one gladiator wins, he stays on the battlefield. 5 Using a natural experiment, they investigate whether professional tennis players are able to optimally allocate their level of risk across first and second serve.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Colonel Blotto Game has been experimentally analyzed byChowdhury et al (2013). 4 Note that a dynamic sequential version of Colonnel Blotto, called Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game(Kaminsky et al (1984),Rinott et al (2012)), is also different since the players decide the order of the gladiators and if one gladiator wins, he stays on the battlefield.5 Using a natural experiment, they investigate whether professional tennis players are able to optimally allocate their level of risk across first and second serve. They show that professional players are very good at allocating their risk taking across different serves.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%