Strategyproof mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games

Flammini, Michele; Kodric, Bojana; Varricchio, Giovanna

doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103610

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Several studies have explored the classification of agents as either allies or adversaries using different theoretical frameworks. Game theory has been employed in some works to elucidate the process of distinguishing between friend and foe [14,15]. Alternatively, a social balance approach has been adopted in many other studies [16][17][18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling the creation of friends and foes groups in small real social networks

García-Rodríguez,

Govezensky,

Naumis

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Although friendship networks have been extensively studied, few models and studies are available to understand the reciprocity of friendship and foes. Here a model is presented to explain the directed friendship and foes network formation observed in experiments of Mexican and Hungarian schools. Within the presented model, each agent has a private opinion and a public one that shares to the group. There are two kinds of interactions between agents. The first kind represent interactions with the neighbors while the other represents the attitude of an agent to the overall public available information. Links between agents evolve as a combination of the public and private information available. Friendship is defined using a fitness function according to the strength of the agent’s bonds, clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality and degree. Enmity is defined as very negative links. The model allows us to reproduce the distribution of mentions for friends and foes observed in the experiments, as well as the topology of the directed networks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling the creation of friends and foes groups in small real social networks

García-Rodríguez,

Govezensky,

Naumis

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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“…For example, an auction is a mechanism that combines bids into a choice of allocation and payments (Klemperer 1999). In recent years, there has been a growing effort at designing novel mechanisms for a wide variety of problems and settings, including peer selection (Aziz et al 2019), hedonic coalition formation games (Bilò et al 2018;Flammini, Kodric, and Varricchio 2022), sponsored search auctions (Gatti et al 2015), and diffusion auctions (Li et al 2022). The advantages of automating the development and/or analysis of mechanisms are numerous (Okada, Todo, and Yokoo 2019), as these tasks require deep knowledge of mathematics and game theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification of Bayesian Mechanisms

Mittelmann

Maubert

Murano

et al. 2023

AAAI

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In this paper, for the first time, we study the formal verification of Bayesian mechanisms through strategic reasoning. We rely on the framework of Probabilistic Strategy Logic (PSL), which is well-suited for representing and verifying multi-agent systems with incomplete information. We take advantage of the recent results on the decidability of PSL model checking under memoryless strategies, and reduce the problem of formally verifying Bayesian mechanisms to PSL model checking. We show how to encode Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and economical properties, and illustrate our approach with different kinds of mechanisms.

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