Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria

Abstract

Due to the absence of a strong constitutional veto player, comparative research uses to classify Austria as country with weak federal structures, occasionally even as a "federation without federalism". From an institutional perspective, the assessment is definitely correct, in particular with regard to the nearly insignificant status of the second chamber Bundesrat. Apart from constitutional provisions, however, there are informal forces at work in decision-making processes. Our thesis is that any approach ignoring the fact that the nominal constitution is paralleled by a real one falls short. Instead, we focus on the Conference of State Governors which, though not established by law, is a strong player in Austria's multi-layered system qualifying the picture of "weak" federalism. The paper gives on overview of origin and function of the conference and its ambivalent role in making up for the shortcomings of the federal structures. Taking recent attempts of reorganizing fiscal equalization between states and federation as an example, the need of reforming the allocation of rights and duties between the different levels and, at the same time, the obstacles blocking the reform is outlined and analyzed.

Federalism, but how? The impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on economic growth. Evidence from Belgium*

“…Wurzel (1999) suggests the need for policies regarding revenue decentralization in order to achieve greater economic dynamism and fiscal balance. Austrian federalism, which has seen many failed attempts at reform, also suffers from inefficient resource allocation due to unbalanced federal fiscal relations (Karlhofer & Pallaver, 2013). For this reason, Fuentes et al (2006) advocated the necessity for devolving stronger tax-raising powers to subnational governments to reduce VFI.…”

When do social democratic parties unite over tough immigration policy?

“…Representing a rural and economically under-developed region bordering Hungary and Slovakia, and led by Hans Niessl and the Minister of Defence, Hans Peter Doskozil, the latter stood for a decisively restrictive line on immigration. Given the federal structure of the party, the two wings not only represented different regional constituencies (rural vs. urban); they are also important powerhouses on whose political support the federal party leadership is reliant to stay in office (Karlhofer and Pallaver 2013).…”

Horizontale und vertikale Differenzen der politischen Repräsentation in Österreich

“…Trotz dieser nicht in Abrede zu stellenden Schwächen kann man Österreich nicht als unitaristischen Staat bezeichnen. Einerseits, weil die administrativen Kompetenzen und die administrative Autonomie auf subnationaler Ebene sehr hoch sind (Fallend 2003;Karlhofer 2013). Andererseits aber auch, deswegen, weil die Schwäche des Bundesrates durch die Stärke der Landeshauptleutekonferenz kompensiert wird.…”

“…Drittens ist aus der Umfrageforschung bekannt, dass die Legitimität des föderalistischen Systems in der Bevölkerung fest verankert ist. Diese haben gegenüber den politischen Institutionen der Gemeinden und Bundesländer weitaus größeres Vertrauen als gegenüber den nationalstaatlichen (Karlhofer 2013). Diese Erkenntnisse aus der vergleichenden Föderalismusforschung können mit Ergebnissen aus der Multi-Level-Governance-Forschung ergänzt werden.…”