Strengthening SIMON Implementation Against Intelligent Fault Attacks

Abstract

Driven by malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus compromise the cryptosystem through fault attacks. Existing fault-detection methods can effectively detect random faults in the cipher implementation, but yield a high fault bypass rate (FBR) under intelligent fault attacks. To address this limitation, we propose a new microarchitecture to thwart fault attacks that place mathematically symmetric faults on the two encryption data paths. To further reduce the FBR for a new lightweight cipher SIMON, we propose a new countermeasure that integrates operand permutation and masking techniques. Closed-form expressions for de-permutation and de-masking in SIMON are provided in this letter. Our method was assessed under two fault attack scenarios (random and symmetric fault injections) with bit-flip, stuck-at-0, and stuck-at-1 fault models. Simulation results show that our method minimizes the FBR to zero with the fault attack scenarios of symmetric fault location and stuck-at-0 fault injections. Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault attack conditions, at the cost of 5% more area overhead than the most hardware-efficient fault detection method. Index Terms-Block cipher, cryptography, fault attacks, fault bypass rate, fault detection, security, SIMON.

A Robust CACC Scheme Against Cyberattacks via Multiple Vehicle-to-Vehicle Networks

“…Theorem 2 Consider system (7), and the reconstruction algorithm (20)- (22). Define the reconstruction error e σi(k) (k) := ûσi(k) (k) − u i−1 (k), and let Assumption 1 be satisfied; then,…”

“…We let step k, let one of the 3 communication channels between the two vehicles be randomly selected to be attacked, i.e., W 2 (k) = {1}, {2} or {3} and let η W2(k) ∼ N (0, 5 2 ). For all k ≥ 0, the second vehicle uses ( 20)- (22) to construct an estimate û1 (k) of u 1 (k). The performance of the fusion algorithm is shown in Figure 2.…”

“…We prove that our algorithm is guaranteed to work (i.e., it provides an attack-free estimate of acceleration commands), if less than half of the communication channels are under attack. This is a realistic assumption as the adversary may only extract the cypher keys of some of the channels [22], [23], or the attacker may have limited resources. Note that even if the adversary is able to compromise all the channels, she/he may not be able to attack them all at the same time as the power supply is usually limited [24].…”

Fault Attacks on Access Control in Processors: Threat, Formal Analysis and Microarchitectural Mitigation

“…Several protection schemes are evaluated in [52] which showed that many of them do not perform better than straightforward solutions like hardware duplication or repetition of code. The work of [53] proposes a new microarchitecture to handle faults bypassing double modular redundancy structures. In [54] a framework for identification of vulnerabilities in a crypto implementation based VOLUME 11, 2023 on known vulnerable operations in the cipher is presented.…”

Fault attack hardware Trojan detection method based on ring oscillator

“…Boneh proposed fault attack to access the key of RSA and CRT algorithm [23]. This attack method can be used in different cipher algorithms, such as DES, AES, PRESENT and SIMON and corresponding anti-fault attack method has been proposed [4,24,25,26]. Debdeep and Michael implement a fault attack on AES-128 by inject error bits on the eighth round, and proposed the hack equations about ninth and tenth rounds injection [27,28].…”