Strict propriety is weak

Campbell-Moore, Catrin; Levinstein, Benjamin A.

doi:10.1093/analys/anaa001

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…We just need to combine Non-strict Immodesty with other principles. This is what Campbell-Moore and Levinstein (2021) do. They accept Non-strict Immodesty, but supplement this requirement with two other principles.…”

Section: An Objection: Strict Immodesty and Legitimate Scoring System...mentioning

confidence: 63%

Immodesty and permissivism

Daoust

Montminy

2022

Synthese

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What is the relationship between Immodesty and Permissivism? For permissivists, epistemically rational agents are sometimes permitted to take incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to the same evidence). Immodesty is a requirement governing our estimations or beliefs about our own credences and standards. If agents believe that their standards and credences are not among the most truth-conducive ones available to them, they are not immodest. Some philosophers think that Immodesty is incompatible with Intrapersonal Permissivism (Horowitz 2014;. Others think that Immodesty can be used to respond to some objections against Interpersonal Permissivism (Schoenfield 2014). In this paper, we argue that Immodesty neither supports nor disproves Permissivism.

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Section: An Objection: Strict Immodesty and Legitimate Scoring System...mentioning

confidence: 63%

Immodesty and permissivism

Daoust

Montminy

2022

Synthese

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“…probability p, we have p 1 = 1, and conversely for any non-negative sequence v with v 1 = 1, there is a unique c.a. probability p such that v = p. We can thus define a topology on P c by identifying it with the non-negative functions in the unit sphere of 1 .…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A scoring rule s is strictly truth directed on a set of credences provided that if c is truer than c at ω, then s(c )(ω) is better than s(c)(ω), where c is truer than c at ω provided that c (A) ≥ c(A) whenever A contains ω and c (A) ≤ c(A) whenever A does not contain ω, with strict inequality in at least one case. Campbell-Moore and Levinstein [1] have argued that truth-directedness is more initially plausible than strict propriety, though it can be used to prove strict propriety given propriety and additivity. We know that additivity is not a tenable condition in infinite cases (Proposition 3, above).…”

Section: Other Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains

Pruss

2022

Synthese

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Scoring rules measure the accuracy or epistemic utility of a credence assignment. A significant literature uses plausible conditions on scoring rules on finite sample spaces to argue for both probabilismthe doctrine that credences ought to satisfy the axioms of probabilismand for the optimality of Bayesian update as a response to evidence. I prove a number of formal results regarding scoring rules on infinite sample spaces that impact the extension of these arguments to infinite sample spaces. A common condition in the arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update is strict propriety: that according to each probabilistic credence, the expected accuracy of any other credence is worse. Much of the discussion needs to divide depending on whether we require finite or countable additivity of our probabilities. I show that in a number of natural infinite finitely additive cases, there simply do not exist strictly proper scoring rules, and the prospects for arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update are limited. In many natural infinite countably additive cases, on the other hand, there do exist strictly proper scoring rules that are continuous on the probabilities, and which support arguments for Bayesian update, but which do not support arguments for probabilism. There may be more hope for accuracy-based arguments if we drop the assumption that scores are extended-real-valued. I sketch a framework for scoring rules whose values are nets of extended reals, and show the existence of a strictly proper net-valued scoring rules in all infinite cases, both for f.a. and c.a. probabilities. These can be used in an argument for Bayesian update, but it is not at present known what is to be said about probabilism in this case.

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“…Attempts to provide philosophical arguments for SP are prone to the same problem: they are not themselves grounded in nisowir (see, e.g., Campbell‐Moore and Levinstein 2021). Thus, accuracy arguments apparently fail to provide a viable alternative to Cox's argument.…”

Section: Argument By Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir

Williamson

2022

Metaphilosophy

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That one person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens is the bane of philosophy because it strips many philosophical arguments of their persuasive force. The problem is that philosophical arguments become mere pantomemes: arguments that are reasonable to resist simply by denying the conclusion. Appeals to proof, intuition, evidence, and truth fail to alleviate the problem. Two broad strategies, however, do help in certain circumstances: an appeal to normal informal standards of what is reasonable (nisowir) and argument by interpretation. The method of explication features prominently in both strategies, and the paper extends this method to apply to nisowir, introducing the concept of canonical explication. The paper illustrates the two strategies with examples of arguments from formal epistemology and suggests that an appeal to nisowir might help to defend against philosophical scepticism by shifting the burden of proof to the sceptic.

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Strict propriety is weak

Cited by 12 publications

References 12 publications

Immodesty and permissivism

Immodesty and permissivism

Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains

One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir

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