2015
DOI: 10.1111/psq.12223
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Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of Career Diplomats and Political Appointees

Abstract: The growing bureaucratic performance literature focuses on differences in programs or agencies led by either careerists or political appointees; yet this literature still struggles to measure and then compare performance across agencies. This article examines ambassadorial performance to provide new measures of individual-and organization-level performance. Using a new data set of embassy inspection reports by the State Department's inspector general, I find that the traditional dichotomy of careerists versus … Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
(36 reference statements)
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“…We ultimately wish to revalorize diplomatic elites as loci to examine state bureaucracies, a scholarly blindspot few have bridged (Haglund, 2015), especially in non-democratic setups (Ekman, 2013).…”
Section: Case Selection: Postrevolutionary Iran's Diplomatic Corpsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We ultimately wish to revalorize diplomatic elites as loci to examine state bureaucracies, a scholarly blindspot few have bridged (Haglund, 2015), especially in non-democratic setups (Ekman, 2013).…”
Section: Case Selection: Postrevolutionary Iran's Diplomatic Corpsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, despite the potential advantages of political appointee presence, appointees usually have less government management experience and serve shorter tenures, which can lead to directional instability within agencies (Lewis 2008). Although presidents would prefer a combination of loyalty and expertise (Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014), increased political appointee presence is associated with lower evaluations for government programs and greater careerist exit (Gallo and Lewis 2011; Gilmour and Lewis 2006; Haglund 2015; Miller 2015; Richardson 2019; Suleiman 2003). Increased political appointee presence is also associated with delays in agency responses to requests for information from members of Congress (Lowande 2019), and longer response times from agencies to FOIA requesters (Wood and Lewis 2017).…”
Section: Politicization and Executive Branch Transparencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Distinguishing between the type of appointment is important because not all ambassadors have risen through the bureaucratic ranks of the career service. Political appointments, for example, are well studied in the case of the United States, where they amount for (at least) 25 percent of all ambassadorial appointments (Fedderke and Jett 2017, 385; Haglund 2015, 659; Hollibaugh 2015, 48). Politically sensitive missions may benefit from an ambassador’s closer ties with the chief executive.…”
Section: Theoretical Expectationsmentioning
confidence: 99%