Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military Power

Abstract

Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution.

Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances

“…One challenge associated with this task is to redress the Eurocentric biases that excluded from the discipline’s scope many cases and issues from outside Europe (Hobson, 2012; Kayaoglu, 2010). Even though the First World War is IR’s “most analyzed and contested case” (Copeland, 2001: 56) and an integral part of its history as an academic discipline (Porter, 1972), the Ottomans, whose decline was a major cause of the war (Anievas, 2013: 734–735), were virtually invisible to IR scholars until quite recently (Bulutgil, 2017; Kadercan, 2014; Nisancioglu, 2014; Savage, 2011; Zarakol, 2010). In International Organization , they appear only in two articles, with no direct relevance (Narang and Nelson, 2009; Tetreault, 1991).…”

“…In International Organization , they appear only in two articles, with no direct relevance (Narang and Nelson, 2009; Tetreault, 1991). International Security , another prominent journal, has only two articles that directly deals with the Ottoman Empire in its publication history (Bulutgil, 2017; Kadercan, 2014).…”

Myths of military revolution: European expansion and Eurocentrism

“…The Ottoman Empire represents a major anomaly for the military revolution literature. As Guilmartin (1995: 303) observes: “The Military Revolution is generally understood as the product of a Europe to which the Ottomans were external” (see also Agoston, 2014: 86; Kadercan, 2013/2014: 119–121). This omission is particularly striking given that they were a non-European power engaged in major warfare with European great powers for centuries, and long posed an existential threat to many Christian polities.…”

The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and Fall

“…Tackling this question, we build on a framework recently offered by Burak Kadercan, who focuses on the relationship between the "bargaining powers" of military forces and the civilian arm of the state. 21 For Kadercan, the bargaining powers of the armed forces follow from the interaction of two dynamics: the salience of the army's corporate identity (or, social cohesion within the military) 22 and the extent to which the armed forces play a role in leaders' political-survival calculi. Kadercan draws attention to the differences between what he calls a "volatile partner" and a "veto player."…”