Strong Presidentialism and the Limits of Foreign Policy Success: Explaining Cooperation between Brazil and Venezuela

Abstract

This paper concerns the growing importance of the executive to the foreign policies of Brazil and Venezuela. Exploring the implications of this trend, it examines the extent to which the concentration of power in the presidency—rather than its diffusion in institutions—facilitates the steering tasks of government in an interstate setting. It focuses on the issue of energy security—a theme integral to both states—so as to tell a larger story about the role of the executive in promoting cooperation in spite of the different policy trajectories pursued by the respective foreign ministries. It concludes that while the concentration of power is beneficial to the monitoring of and intervention into the cooperation process so as to push it forward, in the absence of a strong institutional backdrop, the longevity of such cooperation is likely to be limited.

Soft Balancing the Titans: Venezuelan Foreign‐Policy Strategy Toward the United States, China, and Russia

“…This resource mobilization has been important to Venezuelan rulers over the last few decades, because of its decision‐making centralization and because of the electoral legitimacy and partisan politicization of foreign policy. According to Guy Emerson (), strong Venezuelan presidentialism is key to understanding the country's foreign policy. Terry Lynn Karl's () thesis on deinstitutionalization in petro‐states explains the weakness of its counterweight institutions.…”

The growing divide: Preferences, interests, and the shadow of the future in Argentina–Brazil relations

“…Several authors who have written about Latin America have emphasized the necessity of examining closely the role of presidents (Burges & Chagas Bastos, 2017; Hey & Mora, 2003; Jenne et al, 2017). Malamud (2015) refers to “interpresidentialism” as a diplomatic institution in the region, and Emerson (2015) refers to the “presidentialization” of foreign affairs. This process, Emerson says, has led to a short‐term focus placed on the electoral cycle and a greater degree of personalism in foreign affairs.…”

Personalizing the presidency: Dilma Rousseff and a study of leadership personalities in Brazilian foreign policy

“…Presidents are generally invested with vast properties of power to conduct foreign policy, often building much of its materiality, controlling large portions of policymakers' appointments, and embodying the center of decision-making environments over presidential regimes (Mora & Hey 2003;Malamud 2014;Jenne et al 2017). In Brazil, works have paid recent attention to presidential preferences to inquire foreign policy outcomes that, even not addressing presidents as independent causal factors, have shown how ideology spectrums (Amorim Neto 2011), electoral cycles (Emerson 2015), or political parties tend to play major roles on defining Brazil's external agenda and engagement (Rodrigues et al 2019). Yet, more traditionally, the presidentialization of foreign policy processes is the most prevalent idea within the subfield.…”