2016
DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1242893
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Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador

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Cited by 98 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…4 See e.g. Hale (2016, p. 24), Corrales (2011), Levitsky and Loxton (2013), Esen and Gumuscu (2016), Selçuk (2016), Batory (2016), and Magyar (2016). 5 Among many others, see Connolly (2017), Frum (2018), Galston (2018), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), Klaas (2017), Foa and Mounk (2017), Mounk (2018), Sunstein (2018), and Snyder (2017).…”
Section: Disciplinary Blinkersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 See e.g. Hale (2016, p. 24), Corrales (2011), Levitsky and Loxton (2013), Esen and Gumuscu (2016), Selçuk (2016), Batory (2016), and Magyar (2016). 5 Among many others, see Connolly (2017), Frum (2018), Galston (2018), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), Klaas (2017), Foa and Mounk (2017), Mounk (2018), Sunstein (2018), and Snyder (2017).…”
Section: Disciplinary Blinkersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…20 Likewise, Orçun Selçuk who analyses populism in Turkey, Venezuela, and Ecuador defines it 'as a political phenomenon in the context of a specific mode of governance'. 21 In our view, such politicist definitions of populism are incomplete as these approaches do not locate populism in the context of deeper, underlying social relations.…”
Section: Defining Populismmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…To explore the relationship between populism and CA, I build upon Levitsky and Loxton's study on Latin America (2013), where they demonstrate how populism may represent a catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. The adoption of this framework is justified by the similarities among Turkey and Latin American cases, which are highlighted by an increasing body of literature that compares Erdoğan's populism with South American cases (Aytaç and Öniş 2014;Selçuk 2016;Yabanci 2016). However, while these studies are valuable to understand Erdoğan's leadership style, they do not address the connections between populism and the Turkish autocratization, which give us the chance to test on Turkey the explicative capacity of a framework that does exactly that for the same Latin American countries.…”
Section: Populism and Competitive Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Events like the 1997 'post-modern coup', the closure of the WP by the constitutional court in 1998 or, perhaps even more, Erdoğan's personal experience, 2 had a crucial impact on his choices, convincing him to confront tutelary institutions via more pragmatic strategies (Selçuk 2016) and, hence, leading to a partial karstification of his anti-establishment appeal. In fact, if in 1993 Erdoğan could say that 'there is no room for Kemalism or any other official ideology in Turkey's future' and democracy is 'a vehicle which you ride as far as you want to go and then get off', (Jenkins 2008, 166) in 2001 Erdoğan and AKP' positions became more moderate.…”
Section: Erdoğan As a Peculiar Movement Populistmentioning
confidence: 99%