Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform

Abstract

Prominent theories propose that commitment problems drive phenomena such as war and democratization. However, existing work disagrees about a basic question: how does a challenger’s coercive strength affect prospects for conflict and/or institutional reform? We establish that the relationship depends on how challenger strength affects the average and maximum probability of winning a conflict in a given period (“threat”). We analyze a formal model with a general distribution of threats, and conceptualize challenger strength as affecting this distribution. If the maximum threat is fixed and stronger challengers pose a higher average threat, then weak challengers will rebel (absent reform) during the rare periods they pose a high threat. However, if stronger challengers pose a greater maximum threat, then they are harder to buy off. Applying these insights advances theoretical and empirical debates about democratization.

A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing

“…Second, the frequency of high-threat periods and the probability with which the opposition wins in high-threat periods are positively correlated, which relaxes the standard assumption that the latter probability is fixed at 1 (see also Little and Paine 2024, who model a continuous distribution of threats). These correlated parameters imply that prospects for conflict are not maximized when the opposition rarely poses a high threat, contrary to existing models.…”

“…Instead, an infrequent maximum threat covaries with a lower value of the maximum threat, and the latter effect diminishes prospects for conflict. For this reason, the inverted U-shaped relationship that Powell characterizes between institutional strength and power sharing (Powell describes this as the third main result of his model; see Proposition 3iii) is not robust to altering the distribution of threats as modeled in Paine (2022) or Little and Paine (2024). 22…”

“… 3. Other models highlight distinct ways in which formal institutions such as parties, legislatures, and constitutions can solve governance problems; see Gandhi and Przeworski (2006); Myerson (2008); Gehlbach and Keefer (2011); Boix and Svolik (2013); Ansell and Samuels (2014); Gailmard (2017); Luo and Rozenas (2023); Little and Paine (2024). For a recent review, see Meng et al (2023).…”