Strongly Secure Identity-Based Key Exchange with Single Pairing Operation

Tomida, Junichi; Fujioka, Atsushi; Nagai, Akiko; Suzuki, Koutarou

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29962-0_23

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 25 publications

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“…The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Our construction is proven to be secure without the ROM assumption, while many of the existing constructions are proven to be secure in the ROM [12][13][14][15]. Apart from that, we remark that our protocol uses fewer and morestandard assumptions compared to the previous standard-model works of Moriyama and Okamoto [7] and Yang et al [9].…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model under Weaker Assumptions

Alawatugoda

2023

Cryptography

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A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.

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Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model under Weaker Assumptions

Alawatugoda

2023

Cryptography

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Compatible Certificateless and Identity-Based Cryptosystems for Heterogeneous IoT

Behnia

Yavuz

Ozmen

et al. 2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Certificates ensure the authenticity of users' public keys, however their overhead (e.g., certificate chains) might be too costly for some IoT systems like aerial drones. Certificate-free cryptosystems, like identity-based and certificateless systems, lift the burden of certificates and could be a suitable alternative for such IoTs. However, despite their merits, there is a research gap in achieving compatible identity-based and certificateless systems to allow users from different domains (identity-based or certificateless) to communicate seamlessly. Moreover, more efficient constructions can enable their adoption in resourcelimited IoTs.In this work, we propose new identity-based and certificateless cryptosystems that provide such compatibility and efficiency. This feature is beneficial for heterogeneous IoT settings (e.g., commercial aerial drones), where different levels of trust/control is assumed on the trusted third party. Our schemes are more communication efficient than their public key based counterparts, as they do not need certificate processing. Our experimental analysis on both commodity and embedded IoT devices show that, only with the cost of having a larger system public key, our cryptosystems are more computation and communication efficient than their certificate-free counterparts. We prove the security of our schemes (in the random oracle model) and opensource our cryptographic framework for public testing/adoption.

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