Structural Adjustment and Regulation of Nordic Fisheries until 2025

Nielsen, Max; Hoff, Ayoe; Nielsen, Rasmus; Andersen, Peder; Waldo, Staffan; Hammarlund, Cecilia; Kristófersson, Daði Már; Sævaldsson, Hörður; Virtanen, Jarno; Setälä, Jari; Roll, Kristin H.; Asche, Frank; Rógvi, Heri á; Ellefsen, Hans

doi:10.6027/tn2018-547

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This led to overcapacity and a race to fish to access the resource before the fishery was closed. The overcapacity also induced a policy focus on fleet reductions first in the form of buyback programs and eventually leading to IFQs with transferability in New Zealand, and Iceland in the Mid‐1980s, soon followed by Greenland (Nielsen, Asche, et al, 2018; Nielsen, Hoff, et al, 2018), Australia and Canada (Grafton, 1996).…”

Section: Market‐based Management In Fisheriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can small‐scale fisheries survive market‐based management? Nordic evidence

et al. 2021

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Market‐based fisheries management systems give incentives to reduce the fleet size and employment, which increases earnings and contributes to resolve the tragedy of the commons. However, the often‐stated expectation that economies of scale cause the disappearance of small‐scale fishery is not observed in many cases. In this study, we investigate the effects on fleet structure in the period after introducing individual fishing quotas or individual fishing days with various degrees of transferability in selected fisheries in the seven Nordic countries. Despite observing economies of scale in most cases, it is found that the market‐based fisheries management often does not reduce the small‐scale fleet more than the fleet of large vessels. This is explained partly by small vessels targeting demersal species and large vessels pelagic species, and partly by the larger need of larger than small vessels to continuously utilize their capital stocks through fast adaptation to ensure return. A more important explanation is the regulation design, with limitations in sale of fishing rights and lease between vessel groups and regions and in the share of the total quota holdings of fishing rights by individuals and vessels. This is important for countries considering the introduction of market‐based fisheries management, since the Nordic experiences show that with proper regulation design, economic gains can be achieved with small‐scale fishing surviving even under economies of scale.

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Section: Market‐based Management In Fisheriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can small‐scale fisheries survive market‐based management? Nordic evidence

et al. 2021

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“…Alternatively, restrictions can be made on the various components of fishing effort, including number and size of fishing vessels, or the amount of time they are allowed to fish. This is the case of the Faeroers, where an effort management scheme was introduced in 1996, imposing limited days at sea and the closure of some areas in order to preserve the local fish stocks of cod, haddock and saithe [ 16 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fisheries management as a Stackelberg Evolutionary Game: Finding an evolutionarily enlightened strategy

et al. 2021

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Fish populations subject to heavy exploitation are expected to evolve over time smaller average body sizes. We introduce Stackelberg evolutionary game theory to show how fisheries management should be adjusted to mitigate the potential negative effects of such evolutionary changes. We present the game of a fisheries manager versus a fish population, where the former adjusts the harvesting rate and the net size to maximize profit, while the latter responds by evolving the size at maturation to maximize the fitness. We analyze three strategies: i) ecologically enlightened (leading to a Nash equilibrium in game-theoretic terms); ii) evolutionarily enlightened (leading to a Stackelberg equilibrium) and iii) domestication (leading to team optimum) and the corresponding outcomes for both the fisheries manager and the fish. Domestication results in the largest size for the fish and the highest profit for the manager. With the Nash approach the manager tends to adopt a high harvesting rate and a small net size that eventually leads to smaller fish. With the Stackelberg approach the manager selects a bigger net size and scales back the harvesting rate, which lead to a bigger fish size and a higher profit. Overall, our results encourage managers to take the fish evolutionary dynamics into account. Moreover, we advocate for the use of Stackelberg evolutionary game theory as a tool for providing insights into the eco-evolutionary consequences of exploiting evolving resources.

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Structural Adjustment and Regulation of Nordic Fisheries until 2025

Cited by 2 publications

References 33 publications

Can small‐scale fisheries survive market‐based management? Nordic evidence

Can small‐scale fisheries survive market‐based management? Nordic evidence

Fisheries management as a Stackelberg Evolutionary Game: Finding an evolutionarily enlightened strategy

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