Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts

Abstract

A technical artefact is often described in two ways: by means of a physicalistic model of its structure and dynamics, and by a functional account of the contributions of the components of the artefact to its capacities. These models do not compete, as different models of the same phenomenon in physics usually do; they supplement each other and cohere. Coherence is shown to be the result of a mapping of role-contributions on physicalistic relations that is brought about by the concept of function. It results a sandwich-like structure of the two models, which can be reconstructed as a two-sorted theory element.Keywords: Theory structure, Theory element, Function, Transistor A technical artefact may be described in physicalistic and in functional terms. The physicalistic description accounts for structure and dynamics of the entity, while the functional description is based upon a design-and-use-centred view of the artefact. Both descriptions belong to different areas of knowledge and the question is how they cohere. Regarding the different descriptions as different models of the same entity, this question for coherence becomes a question of theory relation, i.e., of the relation between both models. To investigate this relation, I am splitting the problem of coherence into two questions. The first one is the question for consistency of the models. Though small inconsistencies would not completely corrupt coherence, they would diminish it and we should not presuppose that descriptions of technical artefacts are usually inconsistent. Consistency is reflected in theory structure, so the task is to reconstruct the structure of the "sandwich" of a physicalistic and a functional model and look whether it is consistent. Consistency alone, however, does not bring about coherence. Obviously, the junction of two isolated sets of propositions is consistent, but it would be strange to call this junction, which falls in two, coherent. Isolation has to be regarded as a feature that diminishes coherence (BonJour 1985, p. 95). Some relation must hold between the elements of physicalistic and functional descriptions that brings coherence about. Laurence BonJour regards mainly inferential relations between the elements of a class of propositions as increasing its coherence (op. cit.). According to Paul Thagard, among the candidates for such relations are explanatory and deductive relations as well as other mappings (e.g., Thagard et al. 2002). So the second task is to inquire into the kind of relation that holds between a physicalistic and a functional model and show how this relation accounts for the coherence of the description that is made up by a combination of both models.The required concepts for the reconstruction are introduced in the first section of this paper. The second section develops the structure of consistent two-model-descriptions. The third section is dedicated to the question of coherence of physicalistic and functional models. In the fourth section, I will demonstrate the application of my reconstructi...

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