Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies

McCubbins, Matthew D.; Noll, Roger G.; Weingast, Barry R.

doi:10.2307/1073179

Cited by 963 publications

(402 citation statements)

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“…This category might include debates over the filibuster (Alter and McGranahan 2000;Wawro and Schickler 2006), as well as proposals for super-majority rules in other contexts (McGinnis and Rappaport 1999;Garrett 1999). A parallel analysis might also apply to the regulatory process, where non-constitutional choices about administrative procedure affect the degree to which a particular administration or interest group can secure or block changes in regulatory policy (Givati and Stephenson 2011;McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989;McGarity 1992).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

Stephenson¹

2013

The Journal of Legal Studies

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It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this paper shows this claim to be incomplete, and sometimes incorrect. Although greater separation of powers makes legislation more difficult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted, more difficult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has sufficient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two effects cut in opposite directions, and it is difficult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the expected extremism of legislative enactments. * I am grateful to

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

Stephenson¹

2013

The Journal of Legal Studies

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“…There is empirical evidence that such differential environmental regulations have lengthened the time before plants were retired (Maloney and Brady, 1988;Nelson et al, 1993). Further, this dual system can actually worsen pollution by encouraging firms to keep older, dirtier plants in operation (Gollop and Roberts, 1983;McCubbins et al, 1989;Stewart, 1981).…”

Section: Environmental Policy and Adoptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change

Popp

Newell

Jaffe

2010

Handbook of the Economics of Innovation

340

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“…2 For instance, scholars have studied the initial decision to delegate authority to a bureaucratic agent (Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson 1983;Epstein and O'Halloran 1999) and the assignment of delegated power among different potential delegates (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004;Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2006;Stephenson 2006b). Other work has explored how the legislature might structure agency decision-making processes (Bawn 1995;McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989) or offer various incentive schemes (Gailmard 2006;Ting 2001;Weingast and Moran 1983) in order to align the agency's preferences more closely with those of the legislature, to induce the agency to reveal private information (Banks and Weingast 1992;de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999;Stephenson 2006a), or to give the agency incentives to invest in expertise (Gailmard and Patty N.d.;Stephenson 2007). 3 Under the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), federal courts may not require agencies to comply with procedural requirements other than those mandated by statute or by the Constitution.…”

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confidence: 99%