Structure at Work: Organizational Forms and the Division of Labor in U.S. Wineries

Haveman, Heather A.; Swaminathan, Anand; Johnson, Eric B.

doi:10.1108/s0733-558x20160000047019

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 68 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…In large bureaucratic organizations, technical interdependency preserves some jobs while eliminating others (Hasan, Ferguson, and Koning, 2015). Other research has emphasized how variation in job structure across similar firms can stem from path dependence (Beckman and Burton, 2008) or social categorization (Haveman, Swaminathan, and Johnson, 2016). Research on relational inequality suggests more political causes, whereby advantaged managerial incumbents might construct jobs that favor their allies (Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt, 2019).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Job Turf or Variety: Task Structure as a Source of Organizational Inequality

Wilmers

2020

Administrative Science Quarterly

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What explains pay inequality among coworkers? Theories of organizational influence on inequality emphasize the effects of formal hierarchy. But restructuring, firm flattening, and individualized pay setting have challenged the relevance of these structuralist theories. I propose a new organizational theory of differences in pay, focused on task structure and the horizontal division of labor across jobs. When organizations specialize jobs, they reduce the variety of tasks performed by some workers. In doing so they leave exclusive job turf to other coworkers, who capture the learning and discretion associated with performing a distinct task. The division of labor thus erodes pay premiums for some workers while advantaging others through job turf. I test this theory with linked employer–employee panel data from U.S. labor unions, which include a type of data that is rarely collected: annual reporting on work tasks. Results show that reducing task variety lowers workers’ earnings, while increasing job turf raises earnings. When organizations reduce task variety for some workers, they increase job turf for others. Without assuming fixed job hierarchies and pay rates, interdependencies in organizational task allocation yield unequal pay premiums among coworkers.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Job Turf or Variety: Task Structure as a Source of Organizational Inequality

Wilmers

2020

Administrative Science Quarterly

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“…3 Because there are multiple observations on each winery, which are not independent, we clustered standard errors on wineries. We estimated models separately on farm wineries and mass producers because they were very different forms of organization and so had very different TMT structures (Haveman, et al, 2016), so the effects of many predictors would differ between the two forms. Table 2 presents univariate statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables in our analysis.…”

Section: Methods Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our study period begins shortly after Prohibition ended and the wine industry rebounded; it ends around the time the industry was well established across the country, with wineries in 43 of 50 states, from California to Alaska and New Hampshire, and before the development of the World Wide Web began to dramatically alter how all organizations, including wineries, presented themselves to external audiences. U.S. wineries can be divided into two main forms: generalist mass producers and specialist "boutique" or farm wineries (Swaminathan, 1995;Haveman, Swaminathan and Johnson, 2016). Mass producers are medium-sized to large generalists that produce a wide range of products aimed at the center of the market and that compete on price, seeking economies of scale in production, advertising, and distribution.…”

Section: Research Sitementioning

confidence: 99%

Starting off on the Wrong Foot? Newly Founded Firms, TMT Structures, and the Unusualness Penalty

Haveman¹

2016

Preprint

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*Abstract*: While there is abundant evidence about the effects of top-management-team (TMT) characteristics, less is known about the effects of TMT structures, meaning the array of functional positions that TMT members fill.There are strong norms about TMT structures, so organizations that violate these norms may suffer.This is especially true for startups, which rely on their TMTs for legitimacy.Although many new organizations adopt TMT structures that are typical in their industry, others adopt more unusual structures.To study the effects of TMT structure unusualness, we build on theories of TMTs, legitimacy, and imprinting.We argue that organizations with more unusual TMT structures at startup suffer an /unusualness penalty/ and are more likely to fail, and that this unusualness penalty is stronger for specialists than generalists.We also argue that even if organizations amass experience with unusual TMT structures or their structures become less unusual, the unusualness penalty persists.To test these predictions, we analyze data on firms in one industry over five decades.The results generally support our predictions, indicating that unusual TMT structures have negative consequences that organizations cannot easily overcome.

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Structure at Work: Organizational Forms and the Division of Labor in U.S. Wineries

Cited by 2 publications

References 68 publications

Job Turf or Variety: Task Structure as a Source of Organizational Inequality

Job Turf or Variety: Task Structure as a Source of Organizational Inequality

Starting off on the Wrong Foot? Newly Founded Firms, TMT Structures, and the Unusualness Penalty

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