Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences

Dragone, Davide; Galeotti, Fabio; Orsini, Raimondello

doi:10.3390/g6020079

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(103 reference statements)

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“…Similarly, Dickinson et al (2015) compare students and police commissioners in a VCM with material sanctions and rewards. 4 The two companies operate in similar sectors: more details in Dragone et al (2015). While the participants supplied 3 subjects were inexperienced and participated in only one session.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Dragone et al (2015), we analyzed the behavior of the two samples of workers separately and we found that they have very similar other-regarding preferences and analogous behavior in the VCM. Also, we did not detect differences in the way they use the feedback device.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, in this paper, we pool them together. 5 The description of these tasks and their results are covered in Dragone et al (2015). For the purpose of the current paper, it suffices to mention that both workers and students went through the same tasks and that no information about payoffs or future tasks was given to subjects (subjects were only informed about their earnings at the very end of the experiment).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Dragone¹,

Galeotti²,

Orsini³

2017

Revue Économique

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Abstract:We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study and compare the behavior of workers and students in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism in which subjects can assign immaterial sanctions or rewards to the other group members. We find that both students and workers sanction group members who contribute less than the group average, and reward those who contribute more. In both subject samples, the use of non-monetary sanctions and rewards induces more cooperation. The magnitude of the effect, however, is heterogeneous, as feedback has more impact among students who, contrary to workers, respond positively to sanctions. Students also tend to use sanctions more than workers. We discuss the implications of these findings for social cohesion, cooperative spirit and organizational efficiency in the workplace. Keywords AbstractWe conduct an artefactual field experiment to study and compare the behavior of workers and students in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism in which subjects can assign immaterial sanctions or rewards to the other group members. We find that both students and workers sanction group members who contribute less than the group average, and reward those who contribute more. In both subject samples, the use of non-monetary sanctions and rewards induces more cooperation. The magnitude of the effect, however, is heterogeneous, as feedback has more impact among students who, contrary to workers, respond positively to sanctions. Students also tend to use sanctions more than workers. We discuss the implications of these findings for social cohesion, cooperative spirit and organizational efficiency in the workplace.

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Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Dragone¹,

Galeotti²,

Orsini³

2017

Revue Économique

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Subject pool effects in price competition games: students versus professionals

Beyer

Tebbe

Blanckenburg

et al. 2018

Applied Economics Letters

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Questioning the external validity of experiments that rely on student participants is an evergreen in experimental economics. Yet, there is ambiguous evidence of potential subject-pool bias. We add to the subject-pool debate by enlarging the set of experiments for which subject-pool differences have been studied. In a duopolistic Bertrand market setup designed to test for collu-sive behavior, we test two treatments. The first i s a b aseline t reatment, w here p articipants cannot communicate with each other, the second is a communication treatment in which participants are allowed to communicate. Each treatment is first conducted with students and then replicated with professionals. Our results show that student subjects and professionals differ significantly. However, these differences manifest themselves in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Professionals do collude more, but their behavioral difference between treatments is similar. Students are thus a valid surrogate, if the research question is qualitative, but results generated by student samples should be handled with caution, if quantitative differences matter.

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Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

2016

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Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences

Cited by 3 publications

References 48 publications

Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Subject pool effects in price competition games: students versus professionals

Non-Monetary Feedback Induces More Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

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