Studies in a Dying Culture: Kemalist Columnists’ Coverage of the Kurdish Peace Initiative

Abstract

The founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism, is based on homogenisation of an ethnically and religiously diverse population, aiming, ultimately to create a modern secular nation. Kemalist assimilation policies alienated the minorities, most notably the Kurds, Turkey"s largest ethnic minority. The Kurds" demands of official recognition of their ethnic status met with strong military violence. Despite denial and suppression in the 1920s and 1930s, the Kurdish question has become a critical issue since the 1980s, when the Kurdish guerrilla movement, the PKK, launched an armed struggle against the military. In 2009, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government initiated the "Kurdish opening" process as an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem which ended in failure due to the government"s unwillingness to pursue the peace plan in the face of the growing opposition against negotiations with the PKK. A second initiative by the government was launched in 2012, when the government officials began to negotiate with the jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. This "peace process" has caused a controversial debate between the pro-government and Kemalist media institutions. Kemalist reporters and writers argue that the government"s peace plan is the beginning of an end to Turkey"s national unity. Moreover, holding talks with Öcalan, who is nicknamed as the "head of terrorists" and "baby killer", in the mainstream media, is presented as the biggest assault on Turkish nationalism and a compromise of the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey, most notably, the principle of "one state, one nation, one flag, one language". For the Kemalist journalists, the threat posed by the Kurdish solution process to the unity of nation doubled by the fact that it is initiated by the AKP government, since AKP represents a serious threat to the secular republic. In Kemalist perception, the "reactionaries" and "separatists" were uniting to proceed with the imperialist powers" plans on Turkey.

Windscreens as sites of competing Turkish nationalisms: Kemalists vs. Islamists

“…Consequently, until the republic's first multiparty election in 1950, the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP), had imposed strict control on Islamic political and civil activities. 15 Although the new government formed by the Democrat Party (DP) introduced no radical political changes, as a counterhegemonic move, it succeeded in including previously excluded identities into political life. Its Islamist sensibilities and its politicoeconomic policies however threatened the privileged status of the military, ultimately leading to the 1960 military coup.…”

“…However, the putschist generals' understanding of Atatürkism was different from that of Kemalism; for the junta generals, it was an ideology of national security in which the nation was defined in its opposition to communist, Kurdish and Islamist conspiracy. 19 According to the 1986 Turk-Islam Synthesis Report by the Atatürk High Council of Culture, Language and History which was established by the September 12 Coup Administration, 'we must add the element of religion to the culture without damaging the element of secularism'. 20 For the political Islamists, the major breakthrough came in the 1994 local elections, when the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) was the most successful party, and won municipalities in 28 provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara.…”

Ethnic and Islamist populism in Turkey and its impact on Kurdish nationalism

“…When the national and regional power shifts gave the PKK confidence and weakened the AKP government's bargaining position, both parties lost motivation in sustaining peace talks (Savran, 2020: 788–9; Ünal, 2016: 91). In addition, some Kemalist journalists, who have considered AKP a threat to the secular republic because of their long‐standing Islamist background, argued strongly against the Kurdish opening because they regarded it as an imperialist plot to destroy Turkey's national unity (Akan & Yörük, 2015: 125).…”