2020
DOI: 10.1049/iet-gtd.2019.1330
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Study on attack paths of cyber attack in cyber‐physical power systems

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Cited by 34 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The integrity destruction is obtained in replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and wrong information due to false data injection (FDI), whose common layouts are FDI attacks. The confidentiality destruction is obtained in internal employee attack, utilization of malware, and illegal usage and data leakage, whose common layout is brute force password cracking [13,14]. As a common way to destroy the integrity of information, the FDIA is able to interrupt the outcomes of state estimation analysis, therefore misleading the control center's decision.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The integrity destruction is obtained in replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and wrong information due to false data injection (FDI), whose common layouts are FDI attacks. The confidentiality destruction is obtained in internal employee attack, utilization of malware, and illegal usage and data leakage, whose common layout is brute force password cracking [13,14]. As a common way to destroy the integrity of information, the FDIA is able to interrupt the outcomes of state estimation analysis, therefore misleading the control center's decision.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These patches may trigger other procedures that may interfere with the system's operation. Since these systems' availability can compensate for the high risks of the vulnerabilities, they endure unpatched [121].…”
Section: Financial Threatsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PCAs target the performance of SGSs by injecting manipulated data or altering the transmitted data [4]. Among the widespread smart grids, power systems, in particular, have been subjected to numerous PCAs in recent years [5], [6], eliciting the need for systems for automatic PCA detection. The task of PCAs detection is often treated as a supervised form problem in which the labels and nature of attacks are pre-determined [7], [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%