Study on the Quality Control of  Reputation-Based on Incentive  Service-Oriented Manufacturing Network

Feng, Liangqing; Zeng, Kunkun; Shu, Fangling

doi:10.4236/jss.2016.47002

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Jin Cao, Zhibin Jiang, Kangzhou Wang (2016) studied customer demand forecasting for service-oriented manufacturing based on customer satisfaction [30]. Liangqing Feng, Kunkun Zeng, Fangling Shu (2016) studied the problem of reputation quality control in manufacturing networks based on incentive services, and proposed an optimal dynamic model of quality behavior in manufacturing dynamic network nodes [31]. Liu Zhiyong, Li Bizhen, Ye Songzhong, Yang Shaoxiong and others (2016) studied the different paths of service-oriented manufacturing development of Fujian sports goods manufacturing enterprises [32].…”

Section: Research On Service-oriented Manufacturing Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Service-oriented Manufacturing Supply Chain

Chen¹,

Liu²

2019

Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economy, Judicature, Administration and Humanitarian Projects (JAHP 2019)

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This paper takes the service-oriented manufacturing supply chain as the research object. Through the study of a large number of related literatures of the service-oriented manufacturing supply chain, it is found that the research results related to the evolution path of the serviceoriented manufacturing supply chain are very few. And the evolution path of the service-oriented manufacturing supply chain is the key problem to be solved in the process of manufacturing transformation. The existing research results are sorted out and summarized from three aspects: serviceoriented manufacturing industry, supply chain network evolution and service-oriented manufacturing supply chain. Finally, four key links are proposed to study the evolution path of service-oriented manufacturing supply chain.

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Section: Research On Service-oriented Manufacturing Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Service-oriented Manufacturing Supply Chain

Chen¹,

Liu²

2019

Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economy, Judicature, Administration and Humanitarian Projects (JAHP 2019)

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“…This model has become the standard theory of repeated game models. In terms of reputational incentives, Feng et al (2016) found that reputation incentive can positively influence the service module provider’s effort level in manufacturing enterprises. Özdogä an (2014) constructed a repetitive game model with incomplete information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects

Han

Shen

et al. 2022

Sage Open

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Large-scale projects play an important role in social and economic development. Recently, large-scale projects are becoming more complex with more uncertainties and risks during the construction, which leads to more complex and extensive management problems. In a large-scale project, there is a principal-agent relationship between the contractor and owner. The contractor may take moral hazard behavior to pursue his/her own interests due to the information asymmetry and conflict of interest, which could damage to the public and owner’s interests. Based on the principal-agent theory, a dynamic incentive model combining explicit and implicit incentives was constructed in large-scale projects, after analyzing the mechanism of reputation effects. A comparison was made between two scenarios. One scenario considered reputation effects; the other did not consider reputation effects. The results show that the contractor would be more inclined to make optimal efforts in the large-scale project after reputation effects are introduced, and this optimal effort level will improve with the increased influence degree of reputation effects. However, the contractor’s degree of risk aversion will weaken the incentive effects. In addition, compared to an explicit incentive, the reputation mechanism of an implicit incentive will increase the owner’s benefits. The findings not only provide important support for the owner to formulate relevant incentive clauses in the construction contract, but also has important practical significance for the construction of the micro-institutional environment in construction projects. This study did not take into account factors such as regulatory efficiency when establishing the reputation incentive model. How to combine reputational incentives with the degree of supervision will be the direction of future research.

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Study on the Quality Control of Reputation-Based on Incentive Service-Oriented Manufacturing Network

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Research on Service-oriented Manufacturing Supply Chain

Research on Service-oriented Manufacturing Supply Chain

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects

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