Study on value Co-creation and evolution game of low-carbon technological innovation ecosystem

Shi, Tengfei; Han, Fei; Chen, Lan; Shi, Jianxin; Xiao, Hanjie

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.137720

Cited by 15 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…They found that an increase in government subsidies for shipping enterprises would lead to a decrease in the additional costs of positive emission reduction. Shi et al [28] constructed an evolution game model of a low-carbon technological innovation ecosystem consisting of enterprises, governments, and financial institutions. They found that in the absence of public credibility, the government could expand the subsidy for collaborative innovation of low-carbon technologies of enterprises.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game On Carbon-emission Reduction Between Gover...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the tax level that maximizes social welfare motivates enterprises to select a low-carbon production strategy when the regulator is moderately concerned with environmental impacts [38]. In order to incentivize carbon-emission reduction, carbon taxes and subsidy mechanisms are often combined, such as Krass et al [39], Mahmoudi and Rasti-Barzoki [40], and Shi et al [28]. Liao and Tian [34] argued that governments should implement appropriate carbon-tax policies at different phases, supplemented by support policies paying the most attention to vigorously promoting low-carbon consumption or subsidizing low-carbon behaviors.…”

Section: Incentives and Penalties For Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

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With the increasingly serious problem of global climate change, many countries are positively promoting carbon-emission-reduction actions. In order to deeply explore the interaction between enterprises’ carbon-emission reduction and governments’ regulation, this paper builds evolutionary game models between governments and enterprises under the reward-and-punishment mechanism. The peer-incentive mechanism is introduced to incentivize enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and coordinate governments and enterprises. The evolutionary-stability strategies are obtained by solving the evolutionary game models. The stability of equilibrium points under different situations is theoretically and numerically studied. The results show that the existence of peer incentives makes enterprises more inclined to positively reduce carbon emissions and governments more inclined to positively regulate. A sufficiently large peer fund can always encourage enterprises to choose positive carbon-reduction emission strategies, while governments choose positive regulation strategies. Not only the increasing rewards and fines but also lowering regulatory costs will promote carbon-emission-reduction behaviors of enterprises. Peer incentives are more effective in promoting positive emission reduction of enterprises compared with rewards and punishments. This study can provide important guidance for governments to formulate regulatory strategies and for enterprises to formulate emission-reduction strategies.

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Section: Evolutionary Game On Carbon-emission Reduction Between Gover...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Incentives and Penalties For Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Exploring the dynamic diffusion of low‐carbon technology research and development among enterprises: Based on an evolutionary game model with a two‐level heterogeneous social network

Lou,

Wu,

Chen

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This study builds an evolutionary game model based on a social network composed of two sub‐networks with different typologies, which respectively depict the connections of enterprises and consumers. Enterprises engage in evolutionary games to determine whether to invest in low‐carbon technology (LCT) research and development (R&D), while consumers select products based on the contrast effect. Our results show that carbon taxation and subsidies can increase the diffusion of LCT R&D, but their marginal effectiveness decreases. Lowering the loan interest rate of enterprises with better green credit can promote LCT R&D diffusion, while excessively lowering the threshold will inhibit that.

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Still collaborating? Strengthening intellectual property protection and collaborative innovation choice for enterprises

Wei,

Pan,

Xie

2024

J Technol Transf

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Study on value Co-creation and evolution game of low-carbon technological innovation ecosystem

Cited by 15 publications

References 43 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Exploring the dynamic diffusion of low‐carbon technology research and development among enterprises: Based on an evolutionary game model with a two‐level heterogeneous social network

Still collaborating? Strengthening intellectual property protection and collaborative innovation choice for enterprises

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