Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States

Abstract

In this study, we perform a basic exercise to illustrate the vital influence of institutional rules and structures on judicial behavior, and the impor tance of recognizing this influence in models of judicial choice. Specifically, we estimate several models of state supreme court justices' voting on the death penalty. Beginning with a simple preferences model, an institutional model, and an additive preferences-institutional model, we explore the extent to which our understanding of judicial behavior is enhanced or changed through models that include the interactive effects of institutional features with other sources of influence on judicial choice. Our most fundamental point, clearly supported by the results, is that the effects of case facts, per sonal attributes, and environmental features are conditioned by institutional arrangements. Any explanation of judicial choice must consider carefully the impact of institutional context on the exercise of judicial discretion. Through this approach, the inconsistencies among findings and theory in the judicial behavior literature can be reconciled, and a general theory of judicial choice can be developed.

Legislating From the State Bench

“…Systemic and environmental variables go a considerable distance in explaining the variation in the policy innovation dimension of activism. Although our ability to explain the propensity to overturn acts of the legislature is comparatively weak, our findings are nonetheless generally consistent with Brace's (1989, 1992; see also Brace and Hall 1995) conclusions regarding dissent and Wenzel's (1988) microlevel analysis of trial court activism. Essentially, activism at the aggregate level is best understood in terms of the conjunction of those microlevel processes that influence judges' willingness to allow nonlegal considerations to shape their decisions and the attributes of the institutions within which they work.…”

“…State supreme courts, then, find an expanding policy vacuum in which they have become, by design or by default, increasingly important players. As Brace (1989, 1992) and Brace and Hall (1995) demonstrate well, state supreme courts serve as the ideal laboratories for answering questions regarding the impact that institutional structures have on judicial decisions. For our purposes, because state courts of last resort vary in the extent to which the justices are independent of and insulated from public opinion, we have the opportunity to examine the impact that the courts' relationships to their respective constituencies have on their policy decisions.…”

“…Based on the works of Brace (1989, 1992; see also Brace and Hall 1995), substantial progress has been made in understanding dissent behavior and a number of other issues. Less, however, is known about the impact of institutional structures on state courts' propensity toward various forms of judicial activism.…”

Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics

“…While this has been discussed thoroughly elsewhere (Brace and Hall 1995), one example will illustrate the confusion generated by the case study approach and the ability of comparative analysis to resolve these ambiguities. In assessing the effects of various internal operating procedures on dissent rates in state supreme courts, authors of case studies (Beiser 1974;Sickels 1965) concluded that random or rotating opinion assignment (as opposed to assignment by the chief justice) enhances consensus.…”

Bans on Executing the Mentally Retarded: An Event History Analysis of State Policy Adoption

“…The death penalty remains one of the most controversial policy issues in the United States today (e.g., Brace and Hall 1995;Hall and Brace 1996;Emmert and Traut 1994;Traut and Emmert 1998;Mooney and Lee 1999;2000). For those states that retain the death penalty, it is apparent that political officeholders will continue to feel pressure to consider amending the laws in their states to ensure that they are applied fairly.…”